Diagrams for Games and Information

February 27, 2007

This will link you to files for the figures in the 4th edition of *Games
and Information* These may be downloaded and used for overhead
transparencies for teaching. The files print out much better than they look on
my browser if not, perhaps, yours.

The figure graphics files are in this directory, or by figure via this page you are reading, or as figures.zip or figures.zipp (large files, about 5M in size).

- Chapter 1,
The Rules of the Game
- Chapter 2, Information
- 1: Follow-the- Leader I in Extensive Form
- 2: Ranked Coordination in Extensive Form
- 3: The Time Line for Stock Underpricing: (a) A Good Time Line; (b) A Bad Time Line
- 4: Information Sets and Information Partitions
- 5: Follow-the- Leader II
- 6: Follow-the- Leader III: Original
- 7: Follow-the- Leader III: After the Harsanyi Transformation
- 8: Bayes's Rule
- 9: The Game Tree for the Png Settlement Game
- Table 2-03

- Chapter 3, Mixed and Continuous Strategies
- 1: The Payoffs in Patent Race for a New Market
- 2: Reaction Curves in The Cournot Game
- 3: Stackelberg Equilibrium
- 4: Bertrand Reaction Functions with Differentiated Products
- 5: Cournot vs. Differentiated Bertrand Reaction Functions (Strategic Substitutes vs. Strategic Complements)
- 6: Continuous and Discontinuous Reaction Functions

- Chapter 4, Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
- Chapter 5, Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
- Chapter 6, Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
- Chapter 7, Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
- Chapter 8, Further Topics in Moral Hazard
- Chapter 9, Adverse Selection
- 1: An Extensive Form for Lemons I
- 2: Lemons II: Identical Tastes
- 3: Lemons III: Buyers Value Cars More Than Sellers
- 4: Lemons IV: Sellers Valuations Differ
- 5: Insurance Game III: Nonexistence of a Pooling Equilibrium
- 6: A Separating Equilibrium for Insurance Game III
- 7: Curves for Which There is No Equilibrium in Insurance Game III
- 8: Lemons III When Buyers Value Cars More and the Minimum Quality Is Zero

- Chapter 10, Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and Post-Contractual
Hidden Information
- 1: The Salesman Game with Curves for Pooling Equilibria
- 2: Indifference Curves for a Separating Equilibrium
- 3: Linear and Nonlinear Pricing
- 4: Perfect Price Discrimination
- 5: The Varian Nonlinear Pricing Game
- 6: Marginal versus Average Demand
- 7: Two Depictions of the Single Crossing Property
- 8: Why the Expensive Firms Incentive Compatibility Constraint Is Nonbinding

- Chapter 11,Signalling
- Chapter 12, Bargaining
- Chapter 13, Auctions
- Chapter 14, Pricing
- 1: Different Demand Curves
- 2: Multiple Cournot-Nash Equilibria
- 3: Rationing Rules when pb = 30, etc.
- 4: Location Models
- 5: Numerical Examples for Hotelling Pricing
- 6: Payoffs in the Hotelling Location Game
- 7: Nonexistence of pure strategies with three players
- 8: The Equilibrium Mixed-Strategy Density in the Three-Player Location Game
- 9: The Equilibrium Mixing Density for Location
- 10: Equilibrium versus Efficiency
- 11: The Buyers Marginal Benefit per Period in the Game of Durable Monopoly

- Mathematical Appendix