List of Problems from <I> Games and Information</I>

List of Problems from Games and Information, 20 October 2006

1 The Rules of the Game

1.1. Nash and Iterated Dominance (medium)
1.2. 2-by-2 Games (easy) (2.2, 3.1)
1.3. Pareto Dominance (medium) (Jong-Shin Wei) (2.1, 3.2)
1.4. Discoordination (easy) (3.3, 2.4)
1.5. Drawing Outcome Matrices (3.4 , 2.5)
1.6. Finding Nash Equilibria (3.5, 2.6)
1.7. Finding More Nash Equilibria
1.8. Which Game?
1.9. Choosing Computers (easy)
1.10. Campaign Contributions (easy)
1.11. A Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma (hard)
1.12. Three-by-Three Equilibria

2 Information
2.1. The Monty Hall Problem (easy)
2.2. Elmer's Apple Pie (hard)
2.3. Cancer Tests (easy) (McMillan, 1992)
2.4. The Battleship Problem (Nalebuff, 1988) (hard)
2.5. Joint Ventures
2.6. California Drought (McMillan, 1992) (hard)
2.7. Smith's Energy Level (easy)
2.8. Two Games (easy)

3 Mixed and Continuous Strategies
3.1. Presidential Primaries
3.2. Running from the Police
3.3. Uniqueness in Matching Pennies (easy)
3.4. Mixed Strategies in the Battle of the Sexes
3.5. A Voting Paradox
3.6. Rent Seeking (hard)
3.7. Nash Equilibrium (easy)
3.8. Triopoly (easy)
3.9. Cournot with Heterogeneous Costs (hard)
3.10. Alba and Rome: Asymmetric Information and Mixed Strategies
3.11. Finding Nash Equilibria (easy)
3.12. Risky Skating (hard)
3.13. The Kosovo War (easy)
3.14. IMF Aid (easy)
3.15. Coupon Competition (hard)

4 Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
4.1. Repeated Entry Deterrence (easy)
4.2. The Three-Way Duel (after Shubik (1954)
4.3. Heresthetics in Pliny and the Freedmens' trial (Riker, 1986) (easy)
4.4. Garbage Entry
4.5. Voting Cycles

5 Reputation and Repeated Games
5.1. Overlapping Generations (Samuelson [1958])
5.2. Product Quality with Lawsuits
5.3. Repeated Games (Benoit & Krishna [1985]) (hard)
5.4. Repeated Entry Deterrence
5.5. The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma
5.6. Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
5.7. Grab the Dollar

6 Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information
6.1. Cournot Duopoly Under Incomplete Information About Costs (hard)
6.2. Limit Pricing (Milgrom and Roberts [1982a])
6.3. Symmetric Information and Prior Beliefs
6.4. Lack of Common Knowledge

7: Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
7.1. First-Best Solutions in a Principal-Agent Model (easy)
7.2. The Principal-Agent Problem
7.3. Why Entrepreneurs Sell Out
7.4. Authority
7.5. Worker Effort (easy)
7.6. The Supercomputer Salesman
7.7. Optimal Compensation (easy)
7.8. Effort and Output, Multiple Choices (easy)
7.9. Hiring a Lawyer (easy)
7.10. Constraints
7.11. Constraints Again

8 Further Topics in Moral Hazard
8.1. Monitoring with Error (easy)
8.2. Monitoring with Error: Second Offenses (Rubinstein [1979])
8.3. Bankruptcy Constraints (hard) (for the 3rd edition 8.3, see 10.1)
8.4. Teams
8.5. Efficiency Wages and Risk Aversion (Rasmusen [1992])
8.6. The Game Wizard
8.7. Machinery

9 Adverse Selection
9.1. Insurance with Equations and Diagrams (easy)
9.2. Testing and Commitment
9.3. Finding the Mixed-Strategy Equilibrium in a Testing Game
9.4. Two-Time Losers (easy)
9.5. Insurance and State-Space Diagrams

10 Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and in Moral Hazard with Hidden Information
10.1. Unravelling (hard) (3rd edition 8.3)
10.2. Task Assignment
10.3. Agency Law (easy)
10.4. Incentive Compatibility and Price Discrimination
10.5. The Groves Mechanism (easy)
10.6. The Two-Part Tariff (Varian 14.10)(easy)
10.7. Selling Cars

11 Signalling
11.1. Is Lower Ability Better?
11.2. Productive Education and Nonexistence of Equilibrium (hard)
11.3. Price and Quality
11.4. Signalling with a Continuous Signal (hard)
11.5. Advertising
11.6. Game Theory Books (easy)
11.7. Salesman Clothing
11.8. Signal Jamming in Politics (hard)
11.9. Crazy Predators (hard) (Gintis [2000], Problem 12.10)
11.10. Monopoly Quality

12 Bargaining
12.1. A Fixed Cost of Bargaining and Grudges
12.2. Selling Cars
12.3. The Nash Bargaining Solution
12.4. Price Discrimination and Bargaining (easy)
12.5. A Fixed Cost of Bargaining and Incomplete Information
12.6. A Fixed Bargaining Cost, Again (easy)
12.7. Myerson-Satterthwaite
12.8. Negotiation (hard) (Rasmusen [2002])

13 Auctions
13.1. Rent-Seeking
13.2. The Founding of Hong Kong
13.3. Government and Monopoly
13.4. An Auction with Stupid Bidders (hard)
13.5. A Teapot Auction with Incomplete Information (easy)

14 Pricing
14.1. Differentiated Bertrand with Advertising
14.2. Cournot Mergers (Salant, Switzer & Reynolds [1983]) (easy)
14.3. Differentiated Bertrand
14.4. Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly (easy)
14.5. Price Discrimination

This file is at http://rasmusen.org/probs/list.htm.