Rasmusen's Abandoned Papers (December 2, 2011)
To return to my homepage, go to http://www.rasmusen.org. To view adobe acrobat pdf (*.pdf) files, you will need to download the Adobe acrobat pdf reader if you do not have it on your computer already. Latex-generated PDF files do not always read well on the computer screen unless you really zoom in, but they print out clearly nonetheless. I think I have found the solution to it, though. If you are interested, go to Latex_to_pdf.txt
This page is for papers that I don't think I will ever publish.
- "Price Discrimination between Retailers with and without Market
Power" (with Barick Chung). Suppose a monopolist manufacturer
sells at two prices to retailers in small towns and large cities. To
prevent retailers’ arbitrage, the manufacturer needs to set the
wholesale price difference smaller than the transportation cost. With
linear pricing the retail price for towns will be even
higher than that in double marginalization; and with a two-part tariff,
the wholesale price for towns will be above marginal cost.
- "Some Common Confusions about Hyperbolic Discounting."
There is a lot of confusion over what ``hyperbolic discounting'' means.
I try to clear up that confusion.
In tex and pdf (
- "The Parking Lot Problem." (with Maria Arbatskaya and Kaushik Mukhopadhaya).If there is queueing for an
underpriced good, the queueing can eat up the entire surplus,
eliminating the social value of the good. An implication is that there
is a discontinuity in social welfare between ``enough'' and ``not
enough'' for certain goods such as parking spaces. This implies that if
there is uncertainty in the number of demanders, the amount of the good
should be set well in excess of the mean demand.
http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/parking-rasmusen.pdf or in tex.
- "A Model of Trust in Quality and North-South Trade."
Countries have different comparative advantages in quality. These might
be due to technological differences, or to reputation differences of the
sort described in Klein & Leffler (1981). Reputation differences are
particularly interesting, since good reputations are a form of ``social
capital'' that is amenable to modelling. They can explain why firms in
these industries like to export even if the foreign price is no higher
than the domestic one, and why governments would like to have large
``high-value'' sectors. In tex
and pdf (
- "Economic Regulation and Social Regulation." A long-
standing book project, in the style of my JLS Desecration paper.
``Health, safety, morals, and the general welfare,'' are the traditional
subjects of the police power of the state. When we think of government
regulation, we usually think of economic regulation. This is generally
efficient only for a narrow range of activities and is subject to abuse
by private parties who can profit from it. Social regulation is another
area of government regulation, however, and one where the presumptive
efficiency of laissez faire disappears, because market imperfections are
more common and capture by special interests is less profitable. This
does not immediately imply that the government should engage in social
engineering, because our current knowledge of social processes is
primitive. It does imply that courts should be reluctant to strike down
social regulation on the grounds that it is irrational. My working files
Http://www.rasmusen.org/social/social.htm. The old draft is
available at tex and pdf (
- Notes on ``Property and Quarrelling,'' On the origins of property rights. In tex ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/property-rasmusen.tex).
- Notes on "Forward Induction as Confusion over the Equilibrium Being Played Out." The Nash equilibrium of a game depends on it being common knowledge among the players which particular Nash equilibrium is being played out. This common knowledge arises as the result of some unspecified background process. If there are multiple equilibria, it is important that all players agree upon which one is being played out. This paper models a situation where there is noise in the background process, so that players sometimes are unknowingly at odds in their opinions on which equilibrium is being played out. Incorporating this possibility can reduce the number of equilibria in a way similar but not identical to forward induction and the intuitive criterion. In latex and pdf( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/subgame-rasmusen.pdf)
- Notes on "Incomplete Information Helps Coordination." Asymmetric information can help get to a good equilibrium in repeated coordination games. If there is a small probability that one player can play only one of a continuum of moves, the best move on that continuum will be the only equilibrium. That player will pretend to be of the constrained type, and other players, foreseeing that, will coordinate with him. Notes only. tex and pdf ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/coordination-rasmusen.pdf).
- "Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery." Bidders have to decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating their own values in auctions. This can explain why people seem to get carried away, bidding higher than they had planned before the auction and then finding they had paid more than the object was worth to them. Even when such behavior is rational, ex ante, it may be perceived as irrational if one ignores other situations in which people revise their bid ceilings upwards and are happy when that enables them to win the auction. Paper in tex and pdf ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/carried-rasmusen.pdf).
- "An Economic Approach to the Ethics of Copyright Violation." Handout in tex and pdf. Overheads in tex and pdf. Paper in pdf and tex ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/copying-rasmusen.pdf).
- ``Citation Counts and the Power Law in Different Jurisdictions,'' (with Tom Smith).
- "Testing whether Data Follows a Power Law Distribution" Notes in tex and pdf ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/netmetrics-rasmusen.pdf).
- ``Naked Exclusion: Theory and Law'' (with J. Mark Ramseyer and John Wiley) . In ascii ( http:/pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/99exrep.txt).
- "A New Model of a Kinked Demand Curve." In tex ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/kinked-demand-rasmusen.tex).
- "Tortious Interference in Contract." A paper modelling the asymmetric information idea of Bevier and criticizing the transaction-cost argument of McChesney (1999, JLS) for the efficiency of the tortious interference tort. Overheads in tex and pdf. Paper in tex ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/tortious-rasmusen.tex).
- `` An Economic Approach to Gratitude.'' Suppose someone confers a benefit on me without my consent. Am I morally obligated to repay him? If so, how much? Economic efficiency can help to know what social norm would be useful: the repayment should be at least the cost to the benefactor but no more than the benefit to the beneficiary. In tex (http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/elves.tex).
- "Lump Sum Taxes and Redistribution." In tex ( http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/backburner/lumpsumtaxes-rasmusen.tex).
- "Should Candidates Flip a Coin if the Difference in Their Votes is Small?" A coin flip can be a good way to settle an election if the margin of victory is small and it is known that there is a good chance of fraud by one candidate. In that case, however, an even better rule is to award victory to the apparent loser. In ascii-latex and pdf (http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/coinflip.pdf), or, older, as a Harvard Olin discussion paper. Overheads are available in ascii- latex and pdf. A handout is available in ascii-latex and pdf.
- "The Pattern of Spoiled Ballots by County in Florida " (2001). Regression analysis of the 2000 Presidential election in Florida shows that machine type and percentage of black voters in a county are the important determinants of the percentage of spoiled ballots. In Html (*.htm, http://www.rasmusen.org/special/elections/spoiled.htm).
- "The Idea of Social Capital." (2001) My ruminations on social capital, probably not for journal publication. To see it and links and a powerpoint presentation, go to my social capital page. .
- "Perfectly Contestable Monopoly and Adverse Selection" (with Luis Fernandez) (1993). In a contestable market the possibility of ``hit-and- run'' entry prevents the price from rising above average cost. A contestable natural monopoly earns zero profits despite economies of scale. We show that informational imperfections can also result in a single firm serving the entire market with zero profits. This is possible even under constant returns to scale, and when barriers to exit preclude ``hit- and-run'' attacks and force potential entrants to consider the post-entry response of the incumbent firm. Furthermore, the equilibrium involves cross- subsidization, which is not possible in conventional contestable markets. In ascii- latex or pdf (http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/cont.pdf).
- Democracy and War. Modern democracies do not start wars as often as other kinds of regimes. Regression analysis is sometimes used to make this point. This may be misleading, tho. For one thing, the same methodology would show that Communist regimes do not start wars. For another, it may still be true that modern democracies are disproportionately a cause of wars, by presenting tempting targets for other regimes. Available in Ascii ( *.txt) and Acrobat (*.pdf, 11K, http://www.rasmusen.org/backburner/papers/war.pdf).
- ``The Objectives of Sexual Harassment Law, with Application to 1998's Ellerth, Oncale, and Faragher Decisions'' (1999). Imposing liability on a company for sexual harassment by supervisors cannot be justified as promoting equality between the sexes, protection of workers, or protection of the owners of the company. Such liability might be justified to prevent breach of contract or behavior offensive to the general public-- a "civility code". The recent Supreme Court ruling in Oncale that same-sex harassment is illegal can be justified on these grounds. The ruling in Ellerth and Faragher concerning employer liability for sexual harassment by supervisors contrary to the employer's interest is less satisfactory because the Court's rule will encourage litigation and defensive bureaucratic complexity. In ascii and pdf ( http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/harass.pdf).
- ``Naked Exclusion: Theory and Law'' (with J. Mark Ramseyer and John Wiley). The slightly longer version of our reply to Whinston and Siegal's forthcoming AER article correcting and elaborating our 1991 AER article. In ascii (http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/99exrep.txt).
- "A Theory of Rivalry: Does Number Two Try Harder?" (1989), from my 1984 MIT PhD dissertation "Essays in Dynamic Nonprice Competition". Rivalry occurs when one player exerts effort to improve or maintain his standing relative to another player. In the model of this paper, a player can be either behind, even with, or ahead of his rival, and effort stochastically improves his position. In a one-period game, both players exert the same effort, exerting more if they are even than otherwise. In all but the last period of a $T$- period game, the player that is ahead exerts more effort, and in any period both players exert more if they are even than if one is ahead. Applications to innovation, elections, wars, arms races, and advertising are suggested. In ascii-latex and pdf ( http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/rasmusen_rivalry.pdf ).
- Excessive Productive Search" Even if (a) search produces real goods by a process with constant returns to scale, and (b) searchers behave atomistically, the equilibrium amount of search can still be excessive from a social point of view. Imposing taxes on search can raise welfare by reducing the number of searchers, despite the transition costs incurred in the move from the untaxed state.In ascii-latex and pdf ( http://pacioli.bus.indiana.edu/erasmuse/unpublished/rasmusen_search.pdf) .
URL: http://www.rasmusen.org/abandoned.htm. Indiana University, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, in the Kelley School of Business , BU 456, 1309 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-1701, (812)855-9219. Comments: Erasmuse@Indiana.edu.
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