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E Rasmusen
J Ramseyer
J Wiley
D Hirshleifer
R Posner
    

[BOOK] Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory - all 5 versions »
E Rasmusen - 2006 - books.google.com
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic,
mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, except as permitted by ...
Cited by 596 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

[BOOK] Games and information
E Rasmusen - 2001 - Blackwell Malden, MA
Cited by 447 - Related Articles - Web Search

Naked Exclusion - Oxford Full Text - all 3 versions »
EB Rasmusen, JM Ramseyer, JS Wiley Jr - The American Economic Review, 1991 - JSTOR
Naked Exclusion By ERIC B. RASMUSEN, J. MARK RAMSEYER, AND JOHN S. WILEY, JR.*
Ordinarily, a monopoly cannot increase its profits by asking customers to sign
agreements not to deal with potential competitors. If, however, there are ...
Cited by 142 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

Moral Hazard in Risk-Averse Teams - Oxford Full Text - all 6 versions »
E Rasmusen - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1987 - JSTOR
RASMUSEN / 429 contract. In particular, the massacre contract is feasible for a
larger set of parameters than the "scapegoat" contract, in which one agent is
punished and the others benefit. Section 2 describes the model and ...
Cited by 99 - Related Articles - Web Search

Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma with Ostracism - Oxford Full Text - all 6 versions »
D Hirshleifer, E Rasmusen - Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1989 - works.bepress.com
The unique Nash equilibrium of the finitely repeated n-person Prisoners’
Dilemma calls for defection in all rounds. One way to enforce cooperation in
groups is ostracism: players who defect are expelled. If the group’s ...
Cited by 98 - Related Articles - Web Search

Mutual Banks and Stock Banks - Oxford Full Text - all 3 versions »
E Rasmusen - Journal of Law and Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
414 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS TABLE 2 BANK FAILURES MUTUAL COMMERCIAL
BANKS SAVINGS BANKS S&Ls YEAR No. % No. % No. % 1921 505 1.69 0 .00 6 .07 1922
366 1.24 0 .00 4 .04 1923 646 2.24 1 .00 9 .09 1924 775 2.75 0 .00 18 .17 ...
Cited by 64 - Related Articles - Web Search

Cheap bribes and the corruption ban: A coordination game among rational legislators - Oxford Full Text - all 9 versions »
E Rasmusen, JM Ramseyer - Public Choice, 1994 - Springer
... legislators ERIC RASMUSEN Indiana University School of Business, Bloomington,
Indiana 47405 J. MARK RAMSEYER* University of Chicago Law School, Chicago,
Illinois, 60637 Accepted 10 June 1992 Abstract. ...
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Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions - Oxford Full Text - all 16 versions »
RA Posner, EB Rasmusen - International Review of Law & Economics, 1999 - Elsevier
Two central puzzles about social norms are how they are enforced and how they
are created or modified. The sanctions for the violation of a norm can be
categorized as automatic, guilt, shame, informational, bilateral costly, ...
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Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality - Oxford Full Text - all 11 versions »
E Rasmusen - Journal of Law and Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
522 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS II. MODELING STIGMA The idea to be modeled
is that public declaration of a person's criminal- ity makes other people
reluctant to interact with him. In the models, this reluctance will take ...
Cited by 49 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

Lobbying when the decisionmaker can acquire independent information - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
E Rasmusen - Public Choice, 1993 - Springer
Abstract. Politicians trade off the cost of acquiring and processing information
against the benefit of being re-elected. Lobbyists may possess private
information upon which politicians would like to rely without the effort of ...
Cited by 42 - Related Articles - Web Search

Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The Evidence From Japan - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2002 - Oxford Univ Press
Because the Japanese judiciary exclusively hires young and unproven jurists tor
its lower courts, it maintains elaborate career incentive structures. We use
per- sonnel data on 276 judges (every judge hired between 1961 and 1965) to ...
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Judicial Legitimacy as a Repeated Game - Oxford Full Text - all 7 versions »
E Rasmusen - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001 - Oxford Univ Press
An independent judiciary faces the problem of how to restrain high-court judges
from indulging their personal whims. One restraint is the desire of judges to
influence future judges. To do so, judges may have to maintain their own or ...
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Entry for Buyout - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
E Rasmusen - The Journal of Industrial Economics, 1988 - JSTOR
282 ERIC RASMUSEN The point is older than the concept of perfect equilibrium and
has been made, for example, by McGee [1958] in the context of predatory pricing,
which he argues is not a credible threat because it hurts the predator as ...
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[BOOK] Measuring Judicial Independence: The Political Economy of Judging in Japan - all 2 versions »
JM Ramseyer, E Rasmusen - 2003 - books.google.com
The role of the US Supreme Court in the after- math of the 2000 presidential
election raised ques- tions in the minds of many Americans about the
relationships between judges and political influence; the following years ...
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Strategic implications of uncertainty over one’s own private value in auctions - all 14 versions »
E Rasmusen - January, 2003 - bepress.com
... One’s Own Private Value in Auctions Eric Bennett Rasmusen ∗ ∗ Indiana University,
Kelley School of Business, [email protected] Copyright c 2006 The Berkeley
Electronic Press. All rights reserved. ... Eric Bennett Rasmusen Abstract ...
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The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry - Oxford Full Text - all 11 versions »
E Petrakis, E Rasmusen, S Roy - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1997 - JSTOR
PETRAKIS, RASMUSEN, AND ROY / 249 and Ray (1991), and Cabral and Riordan (1994).
If the average cost at any point of time is constant in current output, then
learning introduces an intertemporal economy of scale that creates a ...
Cited by 21 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

Extending the economic theory of regulation to the form of policy - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
E Rasmusen, M Zupan - Public Choice, 1991 - Springer
Abstract. The mutually beneficial connection between industries and the
governments that regu- late them is the subject of a large literature led by
Stigler (1971). What has not been studied is how firms choose their desired ...
Cited by 21 - Related Articles - Web Search

Why is the Japanese Conviction Rate So High? - Oxford Full Text - all 19 versions »
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - The Journal of Legal Studies, 2001 - works.bepress.com
Abstract Conviction rates in Japan exceed 99 percent. Why? One explanation
involves judicial incentives. Because Japanese judges can be penalized by a
personnel office if they rule in ways the office dislikes, perhaps they ...
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Diseconomies of Scale in Employment Contracts - Oxford Full Text - all 8 versions »
E RASMUSEN, T ZENGER - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2001 - Oxford Univ Press
1.1. THE PROBLEM OF FIRM SIZE A centra] question in industrial organization is
what determines the size of firms. This question is closely linked to a central
assumption in micro- economics generally, that "managerial diseconomies of ...
Cited by 18 - Related Articles - Web Search

Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs - all 6 versions »
E Rasmusen - Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 2001 - bepress.com
ABSTRACT: Much real-world contracting involves finding new clauses to add to a
basic agreement, clauses which may or may not increase the welfare of both
parties. The parties must decide which complications to propose, how ...
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Bertrand Competition Under Uncertainty - Oxford Full Text - all 23 versions »
M Janssen, E Rasmusen - Journal of Industrial Economics, 2002 - ingentaconnect.com
We look at a Bertrand model in which each ¢rm may be inactive with a known
probability, so the number of active ¢rms is uncertain. The model has a
mixed-strategy equilibrium, in which industry pro¢ts are positive and ...
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[BOOK] Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification - all 6 versions »
RM Townsend - 1979 - ideas.repec.org
This paper focuses on avoidable moral hazard and offers one explanation for
limited insurance markets, for closely held firms, and for seemingly simple as
opposed to contingent forms of debt. Agents have random endowments of a ...
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Why the Japanese Taxpayer Always Loses - Oxford Full Text - all 13 versions »
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - Southern California Law Review, 1999 - works.bepress.com
Abstract: The tax office wins most cases in Japan, and we ask why that might be.
The well-known Priest-Klein hypothesis suggests that the high government
win-rate should have nothing to do with any bias in courts. Rather than ...
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Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract - Oxford Full Text - all 3 versions »
E Rasmusen, JE Stake - Indiana Law Journal, 1998 - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Eric Bennett Rasmusen. Indiana University. ... Lifting the Veil
of Ignorance: Personalizing the Marriage Contract. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kelley
School of Business, Indiana University Jeffrey Stake, Indiana Law School. ...
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Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives? - all 6 versions »
J Hirshleifer, E Rasmusen - The Dark Side of the Force: Economic Foundations of Conflict …, 2001 - books.google.com
8 Are Equilibrium Strategies Unaffected by Incentives? Jack Hirshleifer and Eric
Rasmusen Background ofthis Chapter This article investigates a rather startling
theoretical claim that had appeared in major political sciencejournals. To ...
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Managerial Conservatism and Rational Information Acquisition - all 8 versions »
E Rasmusen - Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 1992 - works.bepress.com
Conservative managerial behavior can be rational and prot-maximizing. If the
valuation of innovations contains white noise and the status quo would be
preferred to random innovation, then any innovation that does not appear to ...
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Buyer-Option Contracts Restored: Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem - Oxford Full Text - all 10 versions »
TP Lyon, E Rasmusen - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2004 - works.bepress.com
Lyon: Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, Kelley School of
Business, Indiana University, [email protected] Rasmusen: Indiana University
Foundation Professor, Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, ...
Cited by 9 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

[CITATION] Games and Information
R Eric - An Introduction to Game Theory, 1989
Cited by 9 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Wiley (1991): Naked Exclusion
EB Rasmusen, JM Ramseyer, S John - American Economic Review
Cited by 8 - Related Articles - Web Search - Check Availability

Nuisance suits
E Rasmusen - The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 1998 - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Eric Bennett Rasmusen. Indiana University. Dan R.
and Catherine ... Nuisance Suits. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kelley School of Business,
Indiana University. Abstract. Nuisance suits can be ...
Cited by 7 - Related Articles - Web Search

How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm - Oxford Full Text - all 5 versions »
E Rasmusen - International Review of Law & Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
I. Introduction Should a crime's penalty rise smoothly in proportion to the
crime's harmfulness? This seems obvious, and has a sound economic intuition
behind it. The optimal penalty is the result of a tradeoff between the ...
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Norms in Law and Economics - all 7 versions »
RH McAdams, EB Rasmusen - Handbook of Law and Economics, 2006 - law.bepress.com
This working paper site is hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress) and
may not be commercially reproduced without the publisher’s permission.
http://law.bepress.com/alea/15th/bazaar/art45 Copyright c 2005 by the author.
Cited by 6 - Related Articles - Web Search

AN INCOME-SATIATION MODEL OF EFFICIENCY WAGES - all 7 versions »
E RASMUSEN - Economic Inquiry, 2003 - WEAI
Efficiency wages are wages that exceed a worker's reservation wage. A standard
explanation for such wages is "bonding": high wages increase the cost of being
dis- charged for misbehavior and so help ensure worker honesty. A neglected ...
Cited by 7 - Related Articles - Web Search - Check Availability

[CITATION] An Introduction to Game Theory
E Rasmusen - 1996 - Blackwell, Cambridge
Cited by 6 - Related Articles - Web Search

[BOOK] Readings in Games and Information
E Rasmusen - 2001 - books.google.com
Blackwell Readings for Contemporary Economics This scries presents collections
of writings by some of the world's foremost economists on core issues in the
discipline. Each volume dovetails with a variety of existing economics ...
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A Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts - all 3 versions »
E Rasmusen - Public Debt and its Finance in a Model of a Macroeconomic …, 1997 - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Eric Bennett Rasmusen. Indiana University. Dan R ... A
Theory of Trustees, and Other Thoughts. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kelley School
of Business, Indiana University. Abstract. This paper ...
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[BOOK] Games and information
Eric. Rasmusen - Blackwell Pub.
Web Search

[BOOK] Judicial Independence in Civil Law Regimes: Econometrics from Japan - all 8 versions »
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - 1996 - law.uchicago.edu
Because civil law courts hire unproven jurists into career judicia- ries, many
use elaborate incentive structures to prevent their judges from shirking. In
Japan, for example, the courts maintain an ad- ministrative office called ...
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Predictable and unpredictable error in tort awards: The effect of plaintiff self-selection and … - Oxford Full Text - all 11 versions »
E Rasmusen - International Review of Law & Economics, 1995 - Elsevier
... Page 3. E. RASMUSEN 325 ... Page 5. E. RASMUSEN 327 )1+2 = x Pr(luwsuitlEl = j)Pr(& =
j)Pr(fTi = jld = i) j=w-2 FL+2 = x F(li)Pr(;ll;i = j)Pr(;i = jld = i) j=p-2 (7)
It is then straightforward to find Pr(& lawsuit), which equals ...
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[CITATION] Games andInformation
E Rasmusen - Cambridge, Mass.: BlackwellPublishers, 1994
Cited by 5 - Related Articles - Web Search

A Simple Model of Product Quality with Elastic Demand - Oxford Full Text - all 2 versions »
E Rasmusen - Economics Letters, 1989 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper
application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the
File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help ...
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[CITATION] The Leasing Monopolist - Oxford Full Text
J Wiley, E Rasmusen, M Ramseyer - UCLA Law Review, 1990
Cited by 5 - Related Articles - Web Search

[PDF] The Economics of Agency Law and Contract Formation - all 7 versions »
E Rasmusen - hhttp://Php. Indiana. edu/erasmuse/papers/agency, 1995 - indiana.edu
This article addresses issues that arise in agency law when agents make
contracts on behalf of principals. Should a principal be bound when his agent
makes a contract with some third party on his behalf which the principal ...
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Auctions with a Stochastic Number of Bidders - Oxford Full Text - all 3 versions »
RP McAfee, J McMillan, Centre for Decision … - Journal of Economic Theory, 1987 - ideas.repec.org
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper
application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the
File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help ...
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Folk theorems for the observable implications of repeated games - Oxford Full Text - all 2 versions »
E Rasmusen - Theory and Decision, 1992 - Springer
The Folk Theorem says that an infinitely repeated game has many different
equilibrium outcomes. In formalizing this idea, the most important tasks are to
define 'many', 'outcome', and 'equilibrium', and to specify how the payoffs ...
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[PDF] Getting Carried Away in Auctions as Imperfect Value Discovery - all 9 versions »
E Rasmusen - unpublished paper, 2005 - rasmusen.org
Bidders in auctions must decide whether and when to incur the cost of estimating
the most they are willing to pay. This can explain why people seem to get
carried away, bidding higher than they had planned before the auction and ...
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Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers do not Know the Sellers' Cost? - Oxford Full Text - all 19 versions »
EB Rasmusen, TJ Perri - Economic Inquiry, 2001 - WEAI
The 1981 Klein-Leffler model of product quality does not explain why
high-quality firms would dissipate the rents they earn from quality-assuring
price premia, and it relies on consumers knowing the cost functions of ...
Cited by 4 - Related Articles - Web Search

The Economics of Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities - Oxford Full Text - all 10 versions »
E Rasmusen - The Journal of Legal Studies, 1998 - works.bepress.com
When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benets while other people
incur costs. Negative externalities are intrinsic to desecration, suggesting a
case for government regula- tion if the costs exceed the benets. The case ...
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An economic approach to adultery law - all 15 versions »
E Rasmusen - The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce, 2002 - books.google.com
An economic approach to adultery law Eric Rasmusen Wilt thou have this Woman to
thy wedded wife, to live together after God's ordinance in the holy estate of
Matrimony? Wilt thou love her. comfort her, honour, and keep her in ...
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Observed choice and optimism in estimating the effects of government policies - Oxford Full Text - all 12 versions »
E Rasmusen - Public Choice, 1998 - Springer
Abstract. A policy will be used more heavily in a time and place where its cost
is lower. The analyst who treats times and places as identical will overestimate
the policy’s net benefit, especially for policy intensities greater than ...
Cited by 4 - Related Articles - Web Search

The Posner argument for transferring health spending from old women to olden men - Oxford Full Text - all 16 versions »
E Rasmusen - Economics Letters, 1996 - Elsevier
On pages 273-278 of the book entitled Aging and old age, Posner (1995) discusses
a variety of arguments for reallocating government resources from ailments of
old women to ailments of old men. This letter represents a formalization of ...
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[CITATION] Wiley Jr. 1991.“Naked Exclusion.”
EB Rasmusen, JM Ramseyer, S John Jr - American Economic Review
Cited by 4 - Related Articles - Web Search - Check Availability

[CITATION] Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory, (1989) Oxford
EB Rasmusen - 2001 - Basil Blackwell
Cited by 5 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Of Sex and Drugs and Rock'n Roll: Law and Economics and Social Regulation - Oxford Full Text
E Rasmusen - Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 1997
Cited by 4 - Related Articles - Web Search

[PDF] A Model of Negotiation, Not Bargaining - all 6 versions »
E Rasmusen - 1997 - econwpa.wustl.edu
Bargaining models ask how a surplus is split between two parties in bilateral
monopoly. Much of real-world negotiation involves complications to the original
split which may or may not increase the welfare of both parties. The ...
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[CITATION] Games and Information (1989)
E Rasmusen - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell
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Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments - all 7 versions »
T Lyon, E Rasmusen - 2001 - e-server.eu-tokyo.ac.jp
... CIRJE-F-118 Option Contracts and Renegotiation in Complex Environments Thomas P.
Lyon Indiana University Eric Rasmusen The University of Tokyo / Indiana University
June 2001 Page 2. T| L? L?|[email protected]|t @?_ +i?i}L| @| L? ? L4T*i ,? hL?4i?|t ...
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Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
E Rasmusen, I Ayres - The Journal of Legal Studies, 1993 - JSTOR
Mutual and Unilateral Mistake in Contract Law. Eric Rasmusen. Ian Ayres.
The Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2, 309-343. Jun., 1993. MUTUAL
AND UNILATERAL MISTAKE IN CONTRACT LAW ERIC RASMUSEN ...
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Juegos e información. una introducción a la teoría de juegos. - all 2 versions »
E Rasmusen - Textos de Economia, 1996 - orton.catie.ac.cr
... 1 / 1 Seleccione referencia / Select reference. Signatura : 519.3 R3. Autor : Rasmusen,
Eric. Aut. Analit.: Reyes Mazzoni, Roberto. tr. Título : Juegos e información. una
introducción a la teoría de juegos. P.imprenta : México. ...
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Incentives versus Transaction Costs: A Theory of Procurement Contracts - Oxford Full Text - all 19 versions »
P Bajari, S Tadelis - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2001 - JSTOR
388 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS This literature is normative and attempts to
prescribe how the procurement problem should be addressed under the assumption
that ex ante asymmetric information is the main concern. By contrast, the ...
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Naked Exlusion: Reply - all 13 versions »
EB Rasmusen, JM Ramseyer, JS Wiley Jr - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Eric Bennett Rasmusen. Indiana University. ... Naked Exlusion:
Reply. Eric Bennett Rasmusen, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University J. Mark
Ramseyer, Harvard Law School John Shepard Wiley Jr., UCLA School of Law. ...
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[BOOK] Recent Development in the Economics of Exclusionary Contracts
E Rasmusen - 1989 - works.bepress.com
Join My Mailing List. Eric Bennett Rasmusen. Indiana University. ... Recent
Developments in the Economics of Exclusionary Contracts. Eric Bennett Rasmusen,
Kelley School of Business, Indiana University. Abstract. ...
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``Observed Choice, Estimation, and Optimism about Policy Changes,'' - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
E Rasmusen - Public Choice, 1998 - works.bepress.com
A policy will be used more heavily in a particular time and place where its
marginal cost is lower. The analyst who treats times and places as identical
will overestimate the policy's net benefit, especially for policy ...
Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search

Skewed Incentives: Paying for Politics as a Japanese Judge - Oxford Full Text - all 5 versions »
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - Judicature, 2000 - works.bepress.com
... Eric B. Rasmusen Indiana University Kelley School of Business Bloomington, Indiana
47405 FAX: 812-855-3354 December 5, 1999 Skewed Incentives: Paying for Politics
as a Japanese Judge By J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen * ...
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Choosing among signalling equilibria in lobbying games: A reply to Sloof - Oxford Full Text - all 5 versions »
E Rasmusen - Public Choice, 1997 - Springer
Dr. Sloof’s comments on Rasmusen (1993) raise a number of methodological
issuesthat may be of interest to more readers ofPublic Choicethan those who
study lobbying. I will try, therefore, to respond to them in a way ...
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[PDF] Convictions versus Conviction Rates: The Prosecutor’s Choice
M Raghav, JM Ramseyer, E Rasmusen - Harvard Law School mimeo, 2005 - rasmusen.org
Prosecutors choose which criminal cases to prosecute. If they prosecute more and
thus weaker cases of a given type, the ratio of conviction to prosecutions (the
“conviction rate”) will fall. If their budgets increase, they can ...
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[CITATION] APSR Paper Data—Japanese Judges
JM Ramseyer, EB Rasmusen - 2001 - February
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The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax - Oxford Full Text - all 20 versions »
FH Buckley, EB Rasmusen - Constitutional Political Economy, 2000 - Springer
... Printed in The Netherlands. The Uneasy Case for the Flat Tax FRANK H. BUCKLEY
[email protected] George Mason University School of Law, 3401 North Fairfax Drive,
Arlington Virginia 22201 ERIC B. RASMUSEN [email protected] ...
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[CITATION] Mark
EB Rasmusen, J Ramseyer - 1991 - Wiley, John S
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[CITATION] Games and Information (Oxford
E Rasmusen - 2001 - Blackwell Publishers
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[CITATION] ‘Can High Prices Ensure Product Quality When Buyers Do Not Know the Sellers
E Rasmusen, T Perri - 2001 - Cost
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[CITATION] Norms in Law and Economics in Polinsky, A. Mitchell and Steven Shavell eds. 2005. Handbook of Law …
RH McAdams, E Rasmusen - 2005 - Elsevier Science. Forthcoming
Cited by 3 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] The Learning Curve in a Competitive Industry: Technical Version
E Petrakis, E Rasmusen, S Roy - 1994 - Indiana University Working Paper in Economics
Cited by 2 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Games and information—An introduction to game theory. Cambridge
E Rasmusen - MA: Basil Blackwell, 1994
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Agency Law and Contract Formation - Oxford Full Text - all 9 versions »
E Rasmusen - American Law and Economics Review, 2004 - Am Law Econ Assoc
Various issues in the common law arise when agents make contracts on behalf of
principals. Should a principal be bound when his agent makes a contract on his
behalf that he would immediately wish to disavow? The tradeoffs resemble ...
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[CITATION] Cooperation in a Repeated Prisoners
D Hirshleifer, E Rasmusen - Dilemma with Ostracism’. Journal of Economic Behavior and …, 1989
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[CITATION] Mezzanatto and the Economics of self-crimination
E Rasmusen - Cardozo Law Review, 1998
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[CITATION] Games and Information.(2. Auflage)
E Rasmusen - 1994 - Oxford, Basil Blackwell, Ltd
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[CITATION] Game and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory
R Eric - 1994 - Cambridge: Blackwell Publisher
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[CITATION] Pricing and Product Differentiation
E Rasmusen - Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. Basil …, 1989
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Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach - Oxford Full Text - all 2 versions »
RA Posner - The American Economic Review, 1997 - JSTOR
Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach By RICHARD A. POSNER* By "social
norm" ("norm" for short) I shall mean a rule that is neither promulgated by an
official source, such as a court or a leg- islature, nor enforced by the ...
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An Empirical Investigation of US Firms in Reorganization - Oxford Full Text - all 3 versions »
JR Franks, WN Torous - The Journal of Finance, 1989 - JSTOR
748 The Journal of Finance complete. From an analysis of our sample of thirty
firms the average period spent in reorganization is nearly four years. The delay
in repayment of capital may be viewed as the exercise of an option ...
Cited by 245 - Related Articles - Web Search

[BOOK] The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce - all 4 versions »
AW Dnes, B Rowthorn - 2002 - books.google.com
The Law and Economics of Marriage and Divorce To what extent is marriage a
contract? What does it offer the parties? What are the difficulties of
contractual enforcement and the results of failures in enforcement? In this ...
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[BOOK] Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life
MC Nussbaum - 1995 - books.google.com
"Timely and urgent. . . . Ms Nussbaum's appeal to the outlook of fiction as a
model for judicial and social policy is bracingly Utopian and immensely
heartening." —Morris Dickstein, The New York Times Book Review
Cited by 228 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing - Oxford Full Text
B Trueman, S Titman - Journal of Accounting Research, 1988 - JSTOR
130 B. TRUEMAN AND S. TITMAN ity, it is assumed that even if the manager is able
to smooth income, he can shift only a fixed proportion, g, of the difference, v
- xi, from the second period to the first, where 0 < g < I.5 (Note that if ...
Cited by 200 - Related Articles - Web Search

Impetuous Youngsters and Jaded Old-Timers: Acquiring a Reputation for Learning - Oxford Full Text - all 2 versions »
C Prendergast, L Stole - The Journal of Political Economy, 1996 - JSTOR
1106 ~ JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY themselves may tell much about the quality
of a decision maker. For instance, a politician who frequently changes his
position on some matter may be perceived as unsure of himself, whereas a ...
Cited by 185 - Related Articles - Web Search

When Does It Take a Nixon to Go to China? - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
A Cukierman, M Tommasi - The American Economic Review, 1998 - JSTOR
... We are indebted to Olivier Blanchard, Greg Hess, Eric Rasmusen, Tom Piketty, and
seminar participants at Boston College, Brown University, the University of Chicago,
Dartmouth College, the Euro- pean Center for Advanced Research in ...
Cited by 123 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

[BOOK] The nature of the farm - all 7 versions »
DW Allen, D Lueck - 2002 - UChicago Press
Using a model based on a trade-off between moral hazard incentives and gains
from specialization, this paper explains why farming has generally not converted
from small, family-based firms into large, factory-style corporate firms. ...
Cited by 118 - Related Articles - Web Search

Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids - Oxford Full Text - all 2 versions »
D Hirshleifer, S Titman - The Journal of Political Economy, 1990 - JSTOR
296 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY often accuses the bidder ("raider") of trying
to buy shares on the cheap, offering insufficient compensation given the true
value of the firm's assets. The target shareholders' assessment of these ...
Cited by 120 - Related Articles - Web Search

A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm … - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
R GELY, PT SPILLER - Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 2002 - Oxford Univ Press
The nature and process of the main regulatory changes of the last decade
represent a challenge for political economists. Not only were major de-
regulatory processes undertaken without the active support of the regulated ...
Cited by 104 - Related Articles - Web Search

The Aggregate Burden of Crime - Oxford Full Text - all 7 versions »
DA Anderson - Journal of Law and Economics, 1999 - UChicago Press
This study estimates the total annual cost of criminal behavior in the United
States. While past research has typically focused on particular costs, regions,
or crime categories, this general study estimates all of the direct and ...
Cited by 104 - Related Articles - Web Search

[CITATION] Willpower and Personal Rules - Oxford Full Text - all 20 versions »
R Benabou, J Tirole - Journal of Political Economy, 2004 - UChicago Press
We develop a theory of internal commitments or "personal rules" based on
self-reputation over one's willpower, which transforms lapses into precedents
that undermine future self-restraint. The foundation for this mechanism is ...
Cited by 99 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

Plea Bargaining and Prosecutorial Discretion - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
JF Reinganum - The American Economic Review, 1988 - JSTOR
VOL. 78 NO. 4 REINGANUM: PLEA BARGAINING 719 fined to the set of prosecutor
types which are known to be possible, and these beliefs are correct for
equilibrium sentence offers. PROPOSITION 1: A sequential equilibrium for ...
Cited by 84 - Related Articles - Web Search

Planned Obsolescence and the R&D Decision - Oxford Full Text - all 6 versions »
M Waldman - The RAND Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
584 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS monopolist's incentive to invest in R&D that
makes past production "obsolete" is too high. That is, in its second-period R&D
decision, the monopolist has an incentive to practice a type of planned ...
Cited by 68 - Related Articles - Web Search

Transactions Costs and the Efficient Organization of Production: A Study of Timber-Harvesting … - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
KB Leffler, RR Rucker - The Journal of Political Economy, 1991 - JSTOR
TRANSACTIONS COSTS 1061 Individuals and firms have incentives to develop
institutions and adopt contractual arrangements that minimize the dissipation
re- sulting from transaction costs.~ In any particular instance, the ...
Cited by 68 - Related Articles - Web Search

What Do Judges and Justices Maximize?(The Same Thing Everybody Else Does) - Oxford Full Text
RA Posner - Supreme Court Economic Review, 1993 - JSTOR
What Do Judges and Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everybody Else Does)
Richard A Posner' This article presents a positive economic theory of the
behavior of appel- late judges and Justices. The essay argues that the ...
Cited by 73 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

The Bankruptcy Puzzle - Oxford Full Text - all 4 versions »
FH Buckley, MF Brinig - The Journal of Legal Studies, 1998 - JSTOR
188 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES 3--' ++ ++ ++ 2-+++++++ ++ ++ o o oo 1- o 0000
o o 1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 0Oo0oo00" "c o 1970 196 : 1990 Year FIGURE
1.-Personal bankruptcies, 1966-92; circles = annual filing rates per 1,000 ...
Cited by 33 - Related Articles - Web Search

Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law - Oxford Full Text - all 6 versions »
EA Posner - The Journal of Legal Studies, 1998 - JSTOR
766 THE JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES barrassment. True, people are offended at the
desecration of a symbol. But why is the American flag a symbol? And why do
symbols matter? That they do matter is beyond dispute. A little research ...
Cited by 30 - Related Articles - Web Search

Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings - Oxford Full Text - all 6 versions »
A Wolinsky - Econometrica, 1990 - JSTOR
2 ASHER WOLINSKY information on some underlying parameter which affects the
value of the goods throughout the market, and they are aware of the relationship
between the value of this parameter and the distribution of agreements ...
Cited by 57 - Related Articles - Web Search - Library Search

Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms - Oxford Full Text
EA Posner - University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 1996 - JSTOR
1698 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1697 question concerns the
extent to which courts should defer to or intervene in attempts by groups to
resolve disputes using nonlegal mechanisms.3 This Article addresses both ...
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