Executive Compensation in Japan from Tax Records, April 29, 2011
We have two papers on this subject. Abstracts and links are below.
Executive Compensation in Japan:
Estimating Levels and Determinants from Tax Records
(forthcoming, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy,Volume 20, Number 3)
Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
Abstract: Most studies of executive compensation have data on pay, but
not on total income. Studies of executives in Japan do not even have
good data on pay. Although we too lack direct data on Japanese
salaries, from income tax filings we compile data on total executive
incomes, and from financial records obtain some indication of which
executives have substantial investment income. We find that Japanese
executives earn far less than U.S. executives -- holding firm size
constant, about one-third the pay of their U.S. peers. Using tobit
regression analysis, we further confirm that executive pay in Japan
depends on firm size, with an elasticity of .24, but not on accounting
profitability or stock returns. Corporate governance variables such as
board composition have little or no effect on executive compensation,
except that firms with large lead shareholders do appear to pay less.
The paper is available in Latex and pdf.
A dataset in Stata 9 format will at some point be here. An
incomplete key is here.
We have the Stata Do files for Tables 6
and 7and 8and
9and 10.
We have the Stata Log files for Tables 6
and 7and 8and
9and 10.
"Public and Private Firm Compensation Compared:
Evidence from Japanese Tax Returns"(Published: Korean Economic Review, 25(1): 5--34 (Summer 2009)) is available in MS-Word or pdf.
Minoru Nakazato, J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen
Most studies of executive compensation focus on publicly traded companies.
The high levels of compensation in public companies are often attributed to agency slack
arising from ownership by diffused shareholders. If so, pay at private companies, more
closely held, should be lower. Governments in the United States and elsewhere do not
require private companies to disclose the pay of their executives, but until 2004 the tax
office of Japan published the name and tax liability of any individual paying over some
$100,000 in tax. We match this tax data with executive rosters of about 1,400 public and
4,100 private corporations. We find that public and private company presidents have
similar incomes. Incomes rise with company size and profitability in both, but incomes
are more sensitive to profitability at public firms. In Japan, at least, public firms pay
their presidents no more than private firms do, and they tie that compensation more
closely to observable performance benchmarks, not less.
Minoru Nakazato
Univ. Tokyo Law Faculty
Bunkyo-ku, Tokyo
[email protected]
J. Mark Ramseyer
Harvard Law School
Cambridge, MA 02138
[email protected]
Eric B. Rasmusen
Kelley School of Business
Bloomington, IN 47405
[email protected]
URL: http://www.rasmusen.org/papers/exec/exec.htm. Indiana
University, Department of
Business Economics and Public Policy, in the Kelley School of Business , BU 456,
1309
East Tenth Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-1701, (812)855-9219.
Comments:
Erasmuse@
Indiana.edu.