Comments on: Naturalism and Scientism Are Philosophy, not Science http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2006/04/23/naturalism-and-scientism-are-philosophy-not-science/ Sun, 23 Nov 2008 12:29:17 +0000 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.2.2 By: James Reynolds http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2006/04/23/naturalism-and-scientism-are-philosophy-not-science/#comment-220585 James Reynolds Sun, 27 May 2007 16:45:16 +0000 http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2006/04/23/naturalism-and-scientism-are-philosophy-not-science/#comment-220585 Studying the brain as a lump of stuff will probably not, in itself, tell us much about intentionality and the unity of consciousness and all that other stuff, no. In as far as these things are considered as mentalistic, Platonic, non-physical absolutes nothing will tell us about them at all, because these things do not exist, and this characterisation of them is a blind alley. Obviously we are conscious, and there is intentionality, but if we're going to demystify these things we had better start by not making any philosophical presumptions about them. In order to understand consciousness and intentionality we have to look at what the brain does, and allows us (as persons, embodied persons mind you) to do, in our multifarious interactions with the world. The unity of consciousness makes a lot more sense when you we begin to look at speech production in cognitive science, at how a Joycean narrative - the coherent story of an 'inner world/stream' - is ultimately produced by speech and the anticipation of speech. Then, to understand how intentionality can come about to allow for a semantic language at all, we have to look at what we actually do, socially, with words (words being, essentially, actions) - how through continual practise and training we fall into routines of custom and habit which allow a web of sementics to supervene on 'dumb forms and signs', and create the connection between language and reality. And so on and so forth. There is much to be done but at least cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy is exploring interesting new avenues and making progress, as opposed to rationalist tubthumpers who bang on and on about question-begging 'indefinable' qualia and intensionality and so forth. Ants follow trails and send each other chemical messages. No doubt they are acting on instinct...but what seperates this from our complex linguistic procedures? Is it that they, mysteriously, lack some sort of soulful mental talisman (intentionality or qualia), or is rather that our practises are much more sophisticated and advanced? Our use of language is just as instinctive as an ants leaving a chemical trail - it's simply a lot more nuanced...and familiar to us. We are succesful animals. I detest scientism, and do not think science has all the answers (why on Earth would all deep questions demand a scientific answer? Science only captures one aspect of the world). Nonetheless, the approach characterised by William Vallicella is the opposite extreme, and is just as paltry and just as unhelpful. I think it's time we went back to before the dark ages of philosophy and took a leaf out of William James' book - to stop demanding that explanations take one form or the other before the investigation, and instead go forward and see what works as it comes about. Cognitive science is doing some sterling work. Philosophers of mind are, as of present, not. Studying the brain as a lump of stuff will probably not, in itself, tell us much about intentionality and the unity of consciousness and all that other stuff, no. In as far as these things are considered as mentalistic, Platonic, non-physical absolutes nothing will tell us about them at all, because these things do not exist, and this characterisation of them is a blind alley. Obviously we are conscious, and there is intentionality, but if we’re going to demystify these things we had better start by not making any philosophical presumptions about them.

In order to understand consciousness and intentionality we have to look at what the brain does, and allows us (as persons, embodied persons mind you) to do, in our multifarious interactions with the world. The unity of consciousness makes a lot more sense when you we begin to look at speech production in cognitive science, at how a Joycean narrative - the coherent story of an ‘inner world/stream’ - is ultimately produced by speech and the anticipation of speech. Then, to understand how intentionality can come about to allow for a semantic language at all, we have to look at what we actually do, socially, with words (words being, essentially, actions) - how through continual practise and training we fall into routines of custom and habit which allow a web of sementics to supervene on ‘dumb forms and signs’, and create the connection between language and reality. And so on and so forth. There is much to be done but at least cognitive science and naturalistic philosophy is exploring interesting new avenues and making progress, as opposed to rationalist tubthumpers who bang on and on about question-begging ‘indefinable’ qualia and intensionality and so forth.

Ants follow trails and send each other chemical messages. No doubt they are acting on instinct…but what seperates this from our complex linguistic procedures? Is it that they, mysteriously, lack some sort of soulful mental talisman (intentionality or qualia), or is rather that our practises are much more sophisticated and advanced? Our use of language is just as instinctive as an ants leaving a chemical trail - it’s simply a lot more nuanced…and familiar to us. We are succesful animals.

I detest scientism, and do not think science has all the answers (why on Earth would all deep questions demand a scientific answer? Science only captures one aspect of the world). Nonetheless, the approach characterised by William Vallicella is the opposite extreme, and is just as paltry and just as unhelpful. I think it’s time we went back to before the dark ages of philosophy and took a leaf out of William James’ book - to stop demanding that explanations take one form or the other before the investigation, and instead go forward and see what works as it comes about. Cognitive science is doing some sterling work. Philosophers of mind are, as of present, not.

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