This Weekly Standard article is on the question I have discussed before of whether journalists are guilty of breaking a law when they betray war secrets to the enemy. It seems to be wrong, almost willfully wrong, though, on the Espionage Act, a good example of how we should be careful of any article that cites an Act without quoting its key sentence. So I’ll just quote from the official summary of the legal opinion I found after five minutes of googling, U.S. v. Morison, 604 F. Supp. 655 (1985), which said that intent was irrelevant in the case of leaks by government officials– that “willful” disclosure just means intentional, not with intent to hurt the United States:
CASE SUMMARY:
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant was charged by the government with the willful release of secret government photographs to a person not entitled to receive them, in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. @ 793(d), and theft or conversion of the classified information in violation of 18 U.S.C.S. @ 641. Before the court was defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment.
OVERVIEW: The charges against defendant related to his alleged release of copies of photographs, classified “secret,” to a British defense magazine, his retention and unauthorized possession of classified documents, and his theft and disposal or conversion of government property containing intelligence analysis. In ruling on defendant’s motion, the court held that 18 U.S.C.S. @ 793(d) and (e) was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because, given its plain language, the statute was violated if defendant willfully transmitted photographs relating to the national defense to someone who was known by defendant not to be entitled to receive it, and the statute clearly set out who was entitled to receive such information. Further, 18 U.S.C.S. @ 641 was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad because the statute made clear that disclosures that could be punished under @ 641 were those where the government had asserted an interest in secrecy by classifying a document or information “secret.” It was clear that because disclosures of classified information could be prosecuted under @ 641, defendant’s motive in disclosing classified information was irrelevant.
From the actual opinion:
Morison urges that the requirement that acts be done wilfully translates to a requirement that they be done with some evil purpose and that if he acted with an intent to inform the public he did not have the requisite evil purpose. He urges this Court to adopt a construction of the word wilfully used in Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680, 686, 88 L. Ed. 1534, 64 S. Ct. 1233 (1944). In that case, the court, noting that the statute was a highly penal one restricting freedom of expression, held that the word “wilful” must be taken to mean “deliberately and with a specific purpose to do the acts proscribed by Congress.” In another sentence, the Court referred to this “evil purpose;” however, in the rest of the opinion the court refers only to the specific intent to do the evil prohibited by the statute, i.e., causing or attempting to cause insubordination, disloyalty, or mutiny. That case did not require[**22] “evil purpose” as the defendant reads it, but only required that the prohibited acts be done deliberately and with a specific purpose to do that which was prohibited. In Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d at 919, the court discussed the trial court’s instruction that “wilfully” meant “not prompted by an honest mistake as to one’s duties, but prompted by some personal or underhanded motive” and apparently approved such an instruction.
This is from the Indian Museum on the Mall in Washington DC. You can touch an arrowhead on the picture of the cabinet on the computer screen, and go to a close-up of that arrowhead and details of its history. Many, many museums should do this. It’s too expensive for the Olmstead Museum in Somonauk, Illinois, though.
I saw this in Arlington, Virginia, just off of Fairfax Road.
I saw this sign in Washington, D.C.