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	<title>Comments on: Hayek on Economic&#8217;s Method</title>
	<link>http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2007/07/02/hayek-on-economics-method/</link>
	<description></description>
	<pubDate>Mon, 06 Oct 2008 22:38:15 +0000</pubDate>
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		<title>By: michael webster</title>
		<link>http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2007/07/02/hayek-on-economics-method/#comment-225452</link>
		<author>michael webster</author>
		<pubDate>Sat, 20 Oct 2007 14:42:37 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid>http://www.rasmusen.org/x/2007/07/02/hayek-on-economics-method/#comment-225452</guid>
		<description>Eric, can you give me a sense of why Scott Plous's excellent paper which  modelled the US/USSR arms race with each decision maker having 1) their own utility functions, 2) an estimate of, or imperfect information about, the other decision maker's utility function, and 3) systemic mismatch about what each person thought the other's utility function was never generated much interest in game theory?  Feel free to contact me by email.</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Eric, can you give me a sense of why Scott Plous&#8217;s excellent paper which  modelled the US/USSR arms race with each decision maker having 1) their own utility functions, 2) an estimate of, or imperfect information about, the other decision maker&#8217;s utility function, and 3) systemic mismatch about what each person thought the other&#8217;s utility function was never generated much interest in game theory?  Feel free to contact me by email.</p>
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