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\begin{large} {\bf GAMES AND INFORMATION, FOURTH EDITION}

An Introduction to Game Theory \end{large}

\vspace{72pt} {\bf Eric Rasmusen}

\vspace{150pt} Basil Blackwell

\end{center}


23 November 2005.  Eric Rasmusen, Erasmuse@indiana.edu. http:
//www.rasmusen.org/GI

\newpage

\begin{center} {\bf Contents  }

(starred sections are less important)

 \end{center}

\begin{enumerate}

{\it \item[] List of Figures

\item[] List of Tables

\item[] List of Games
}

\item[] Preface

\begin{itemize}
  \item[] Contents and Purpose \item[] Changes in  the Second Edition (1994)
\item[] Changes in  the Third Edition (2001) \item[] Changes in  the Fourth
Edition (2006)
 \item[] Using the Book \item[]The Level of Mathematics \item[] Other Books
\item[] Contact Information \item[] Acknowledgements \end{itemize}

\item[] Introduction

\begin{itemize} \item[] History \item[]Game Theory's Method \item[]
Exemplifying Theory \item[] This Book's Style \item[] Notes \end{itemize}

\noindent PART 1: GAME THEORY

\item[1] The Rules of the Game
\begin{itemize} \item[1.1] Definitions \item[1.2] Dominated and Dominant
Strategies: The Prisoner’s Dilemma \item[1.3]  Iterated Dominance: The Battle of
the Bismarck Sea \item[1.4] Nash Equilibrium: Boxed Pigs, The Battle  of the
Sexes, and Ranked Coordination
\item[1.5] Focal Points \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game
\end{itemize}

\bigskip

\item[2] Information
 \begin{itemize} \item[2.1] The Strategic and Extensive Forms of a Game
\item[2.2] Information Sets \item[2.3] Perfect, Certain, Symmetric, and Complete
Information
\item[2.4] The Harsanyi Transformation and  Bayesian Games \item[2.5] Example:
The Png Settlement Game \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game
\end{itemize}

\bigskip

\item[3] Mixed and Continuous Strategies
\begin{itemize}
 \item[3.1] Mixed Strategies: The Welfare Game
\item[3.2] The Payoff-Equating Method and Games of Timing
 \item[*3.3] Mixed Strategies  with General  Parameters and $N$ Players:  The
Civic Duty Game
\item[*3.4]Randomizing Is Not Always Mixing: The Auditing Game
 \item[3.5] Continuous Strategies: The Cournot Game
 \item[3.6] Continuous Strategies: The Bertrand Game, Strategic Complements, and
Strategic Substitutes (newly moved here)
  \item[*3.7] Existence of Equilibrium (new)
  \item[] Notes
\item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game
\end{itemize}

\bigskip

\item[4] Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
 \begin{itemize} \item[4.1] Subgame Perfectness \item[4.2] An Example of
Perfectness: Entry Deterrence I \item[4.3] Credible Threats, Sunk  Costs, and
the Open-Set Problem in the Game of Nuisance Suits
\item[*4.4] Recoordination to Pareto-Dominant Equilibria in Subgames: Pareto
Perfection
 \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

\item[5] Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
\begin{itemize} \item[5.1] Finitely Repeated Games and the Chainstore Paradox
\item[5.2] Infinitely Repeated Games, Minimax Punishments,  and the Folk Theorem
\item[5.3] Reputation: The One-sided Prisoner's Dilemma \item[5.4] Product
Quality  in an Infinitely Repeated Game
\item[*5.5] Markov Equilibria and Overlapping Generations: 
Customer Switching Costs
 \item[*5.6] Evolutionary Equilibrium: The Hawk-Dove Game
 \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

\item[6]
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
 \begin{itemize}
 \item[6.1] Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: Entry Deterrence  II  and III
\item[6.2] Refining Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium: The PhD Admissions Game
 \item[6.3] The Importance of Common Knowledge: Entry Deterrence   IV and  V
\item[6.4] Incomplete Information in the  Repeated   Prisoner's Dilemma: The
Gang of Four Model
\item[6.5] The Axelrod Tournament \item[*6.6] Credit and the Age of the Firm:
The Diamond Model \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game
\end{itemize}

 \bigskip \noindent PART 2: ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION

        \item[7] Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions \begin{itemize}
 \item[7.1]
Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
 \item[7.2] A Principal-Agent Model:  The Production Game
\item[7.3] The Incentive Compatibility and Participation 
Constraints
 \item[7.4] Optimal Contracts: The Broadway Game
 \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

     \item[8] Further Topics in Moral Hazard \begin{itemize} \item[8.1]
Efficiency Wages
 \item[8.2] Tournaments
 \item[*8.3] Institutions and Agency Problems
 \item[*8.4] Renegotiation: the Repossession Game
 \item[*8.5] State-space Diagrams:  Insurance Games  I and  II
 \item[*8.6] Joint Production by Many Agents: The Holmstrom Teams Model
     \item[*8.7] The Multitask Agency Problem (new)
      \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

               \item[9] Adverse Selection
  \begin{itemize}
 \item[9.1] Introduction: Production Game VI
  \item[9.2] Adverse Selection under Certainty:  Lemons  I  and II
 \item[9.3] Heterogeneous Tastes: Lemons  III and IV
 \item[9.4] Adverse Selection under Uncertainty: Insurance Game III
  \item[*9.5] Market Microstructure
  \item[*9.6] A  Variety of Applications
\item[9.7]   Adverse Selection  and  Moral Hazard Combined: Production Game VII
(new)
\item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

\item[10]  Mechanism Design  and Post-Contractual Hidden Knowledge
  \begin{itemize}
  \item[10.1] Mechanisms,  Unravelling,   the Maskin Matching Scheme,   and the
Revelation Principle (new model)
\item[10.2]  Myerson Mechanism Design
  \item[10.3]  An Example of    Post-Contractual  Hidden Knowledge:   The
Salesman Game
\item[*10.4] The Groves Mechanism
\item[*10.5]   Price Discrimination
\item[*10.6] Rate-of-Return Regulation and Government Procurement
  \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

 \item[11] Signalling
\begin{itemize} \item[11.1] The Informed Player Moves First: Signalling
\item[11.2] Variants on the Signalling Model of Education
\item[11.3] General Comments on  Signalling in Education \item[11.4] The
Informed Player Moves Second: Screening
 \item[*11.5] Two Signals: The Game of Underpricing New Stock Issues
\item[*11.6] Signal Jamming and  Limit Pricing  (new model)
 \item[*11.7] Countersignalling (new)
\item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

 \bigskip \noindent PART 3:  APPLICATIONS

\item[12] Bargaining \begin{itemize}
 \item[12.1] The Basic Bargaining Problem: Splitting a Pie
 \item[12.2] The Nash Bargaining Solution \item[12.3] Alternating Offers  over
Finite Time
  \item[12.4] Alternating Offers  over Infinite Time \item[12.5] Incomplete
Information
 \item[*12.6] Setting up a Way to Bargain: The  Myerson-Satterthwaite Mechanism
\item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game
 \end{itemize}

\item[13] Auctions \begin{itemize}
 \item[13.1] Values Private and Common, Continuous and Discrete
  \item[13.2] Optimal Strategies under Different   Rules  in Private-Value
Auctions
\item[13.3] Revenue Equivalence,  Risk Aversion, and Uncertainty
   \item[*13.4] Reserve Prices and  the  Marginal Revenue    Approach  (new)
\item[13.5]  Common-Value Auctions and the Winner's Curse (new model)
\item[*13.6]  Asymmetric Equilibria, Affiliation, and Linkage: The Wallet Game
(new)
 \item[] Notes \item[] Problems
  \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}





\item[14] Pricing \begin{itemize}
 \item[14.1] Quantities as Strategies:   Cournot Equilibrium Revisited
 \item[14.2] Capacity Constraints: The Edgeworth Paradox
 \item[14.3] Location Models
  \item[*14.4] Comparative Statics and   Supermodular Games
 \item[*14.5]  Vertical Differentiation (new)
  \item[*14.6] Durable Monopoly
 \item[] Notes \item[] Problems \item[] Classroom Game \end{itemize}

\item[*A] Mathematical Appendix
 \begin{itemize} \item[*A.1]
   Notation \item[*A.2]  The Greek Alphabet \item[*A.3] Glossary \item[*A.4]
Formulas and Functions
 \item[*A.5]   Probability Distributions \item[*A.6]   Supermodularity
\item[*A.7]    Fixed Point Theorems \item[*A.8]  Genericity \item[*A.9]
Discounting
 \item[*A.10]  Risk
 \end{itemize}

     \item[] References and Name Index

\item[] Subject Index

\end{enumerate}

\newpage

{\bf   List of Figures}
\begin{itemize}

\item[1] The Rules of the Game
\begin{itemize}
\item[1]: The Dry Cleaners Game as a Decision Tree
\item[2]: The Dry Cleaners Game as a Game Tree

  \end{itemize}



\item[2] Information
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: Follow-the-Leader I in Extensive Form
\item[2]: Ranked Coordination in Extensive Form
\item[3]: The Time Line for Stock Underpricing: (a) A Good Time Line; (b)
A Bad Time Line
\item[4]: Information Sets and Information Partitions.
\item[5]: Follow-the-Leader II
\item[6]: Follow-the-Leader III: Original
\item[7]: Follow-the-Leader III: After the Harsanyi Transformation
\item[8]: Bayes’s Rule
\item[9]: The Game Tree for the Png Settlement Game

 \end{itemize}


\item[3] Mixed and Continuous Strategies
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: The Payoffs in Patent Race for a New Market
\item[2]: Reaction Curves in The Cournot Game
\item[3]: Stackelberg Equilibrium
\item[4]: Bertrand Reaction Functions with Differentiated Products
\item[5]: Cournot vs. Differentiated Bertrand Reaction Functions (Strategic
Substitutes vs. Strategic Complements)
\item[6]: Continuous and Discontinuous Reaction Functions

\end{itemize}



\item[4] Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
 \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Follow the Leader I
\item[2]: The Tremble Game: Trembling Hand Versus Subgame Perfectness
\item[3]: Entry Deterrence I
\item[4]: The Extensive Form for Nuisance Suits
\item[5]: The Pareto Perfection Puzzle

\end{itemize}

\item[5] Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: The Dimensionality Condition
\item[2]: Evolutionary Dynamics in the Hawk-Dove- Bourgeois Game

 \end{itemize}

\item[6]
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
 \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Entry Deterrence II, III, and IV
\item[2]: The PhD Admissions Game
\item[3]: Entry Deterrence V
\item[4]: The Interest Rate over Time
\item[5]: The Beer-Quiche Game

\end{itemize}



        \item[7] Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
\item[2]: The Efficient Effort Level in Production Game I
\item[3]: Three Contracts that Induce Effort $e^\ast$ for wage $w^\ast$
\item[4]: Shifting Supports in an Agency Model

\end{itemize}

     \item[8] Further Topics in Moral Hazard
 \begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: Insurance Game I
\item[2]: Insurance Game II with Full and Partial Insurance
\item[3]: More on Partial Insurance in Insurance Game II
\item[4]: Contracts in the Holmstrom Teams Model

 \end{itemize}

               \item[9] Adverse Selection
  \begin{itemize}

\item[1]: An Extensive Form for Lemons I
\item[2]: Lemons II: Identical Tastes
\item[3]: Lemons III:    Buyers Value Cars More Than Sellers:
\item[4]: Lemons IV: Sellers’ Valuations Differ
\item[5]: Insurance Game III: Nonexistence of a Pooling Equilibrium
\item[6]: A Separating Equilibrium for Insurance Game III
\item[7]: Curves for Which There is No Equilibrium in Insurance Game III
\item[8]: Lemons III When Buyers Value Cars More and the Minimum
Quality is Zero


\end{itemize}

\item[10] Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and Post-Contractual  Hidden
Information
 \begin{itemize}

\item[1]: The Salesman Game  with  Curves for Pooling Equilibria
\item[2]: Indifference Curves for a Separating Equilibrium
\item[3]: Linear and Nonlinear Pricing
\item[4]: Perfect Price Discrimination
\item[5]: The Varian Nonlinear Pricing Game
\item[6]: Marginal versus Average Demand
\item[7]: Two Depictions of the Single Crossing Property
\item[8]: Why the Expensive Firm’s Incentive Compatibility Constraint Is
Nonbinding
 \end{itemize}

 \item[11] Signalling
\begin{itemize}

\item[1]: Education VI: No Pooling Equilibrium in a Screening Game
\item[2]: Education VII: Neither Separating nor Pooling Pure-Strategy
Equilibria in a Screening Game
\item[3]: How the Signal Changes with the Variance
\item[4]: Different Ways to Signal a Given Company Value

\end{itemize}



\item[12] Bargaining
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: (a) Nash Bargaining Game; (b) Splitting a Pie
\item[2]: Trades in Bilateral Trading II
\item[3]: Trade in the one-price equilibrium
\item[4]: Trade in the linear equilibrium

 \end{itemize}

\item[13] Auctions
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Smoothing a Discrete Distribution
\item[2]: The Bid Function in an All-Pay Auction with Identical Buyers
\item[3a]: Auctions and Marginal Revenue: Reserve Price Needed
\item[3b]: Auctions and Marginal Revenue: No Reserve Price Needed
\item[4]: Extracting Information From Uniformly Distributed Signals

 \end{itemize}





\item[14] Pricing
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Different Demand Curves
\item[2]: Multiple Cournot-Nash Equilibria
\item[3]: Rationing Rules when pb = 30, pa > 30, and K = 70
\item[4]: Location Models
\item[5]: Numerical Examples for Hotelling Pricing
\item[6]: Payoffs in the Hotelling Location Game
\item[7]: Nonexistence of pure strategies with three players
\item[8]: The Equilibrium Mixed-Strategy Density in the Three-Player
Location Game
\item[9]: The Equilibrium Mixing Density for Location
\item[10]: Equilibrium versus Efficiency
\item[11]: The Buyer’s Marginal Benefit per Period in the Game of Durable
Monopoly
 \end{itemize}

\item[A] Mathematical Appendix
 \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Concavity and Convexity
\item[2]: Upper Semicontinuity
\item[3]: A mapping with three fixed points
\item[4]: Discounting
\item[5]: Mean Preserving Spreads

\end{itemize}




\end{itemize}


\newpage

{\bf  List of Tables}

\begin{itemize}

\item[1] The Rules of the Game
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1a]: The Dry Cleaners Game: Normal Economy
\item[1b]: The Dry Cleaners Game: Recession
\item[2]: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
\item[3]: The Battle of the Bismarck Sea
\item[4]: The Iteration Path Game
\item[5]: Boxed Pigs
\item[6]: The Modeller’s Dilemma
\item[7]: The Battle of the Sexes
\item[8]: Ranked Coordination
\item[9]: Dangerous Coordination
\item[10] A General Prisoner’s Dilemma
\item[11]: An Abstract Game
\item[12]: Flavor and Texture
\item[13]: Which Game?
\item[14]:A Three-By-Three Game
 \end{itemize}



\item[2] Information
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Ranked Coordination
\item[2]: Follow-the-Leader I
\item[3]: Information Partitions
\item[4]: Information Categories
\item[5]:  Bayesian Terminology
\item[6]: Payoffs A, The Prisoner’s Dilemma
\item[7]: Payoffs B, A Confession Game

 \end{itemize}


\item[3] Mixed and Continuous Strategies
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: The Welfare Game
\item[2]: Chicken
\item[3]: Grab the Dollar
\item[4]: The General 2-by-2 Game
\item[5]: 2-by-2 Games with Mixed Strategy Equilibria
\item[6]: The Civic Duty Game
\item[7]: Pure Strategies Dominated by a Mixed Strategy
\item[8]: Auditing Game I
\item[9]: A Game for the 1996 Midterm
\item[10]: A Takeover Game
\item[11]: IMF Aid.



\end{itemize}



\item[4] Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
 \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Entry Deterrence I
\item[2]: Payoffs from Different Policies
\item[3]:

\end{itemize}

\item[5] Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: The Minimax Illustration Game
\item[2]: Prisoner’s Dilemmas
\item[3]: Some repeated games in which reputation is important
\item[4]: The Utopian Exchange Economy Game
\item[5]: Hawk-Dove: Economics Notation
\item[6]: Hawk-Dove: Biology Notation
\item[7]: A Benoit-Krishna Game
\item[8]: Evolutionarily Stable Strategies
\item[9]: Conversation Dynamics
\item[10]: Grab the Dollar
\item[11]: Grab the Dollar: Dynamics

\end{itemize}

\item[6]
Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
 \begin{itemize}
\item[1]: The Prisoner’s Dilemma
\item[2]: Subgame Payoffs in the Expensive-Talk Game
\item[3]: The Prisoner’s Dilemma

 \end{itemize}



        \item[7] Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
\begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: Applications of the Principal-Agent Model
\item[2]: Profits in Broadway Game I
\item[3]: Probabilities of Profits in Broadway Game I
\item[4]: Profits in Broadway Game II
\item[5]: A Moral Hazard Game
\item[6]: Output from Low and High Effort
\item[7]: Entrepreneurs Selling Out
\item[8]: Output Probabilities
\item[9]: Output Probabilities
\item[10]: Effort and Outputs
\item[11]: Efforts and Outputs
\item[12]: Bankruptcy
\end{itemize}

     \item[8] Further Topics in Moral Hazard
\begin{itemize}
\item[1]: Output in the Lucky Executive Game
\item[2]: Crime
\item[3]: More Crime
\item[4]: Bankruptcy
\item[5]: Team output

 \end{itemize}

               \item[9] Adverse Selection
  \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Insurance Game III: Payoffs
\item[2]: Two-Time Losers


\end{itemize}

\item[10] Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and Post-Contractual  Hidden
Information
 \begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: The Right To Silence Game payoffs

\end{itemize}

 \item[11] Signalling
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Marriage Values

\end{itemize}



\item[12] Bargaining
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Alternating Offers over Finite Time
\item[2]: Alternating Offers over Infinite Time

\end{itemize}

\item[13] Auctions
\begin{itemize}
  \item[1]: Bids by Serious Competitors in Oil Auctions
\item[2]: The Tai-Pan Game

 \end{itemize}





\item[14] Pricing
\begin{itemize}
\item
 \end{itemize}

\item[*A] Mathematical Appendix
 \begin{itemize}
 \item[1]: Some Useful Functional Forms
\item[2]: Discounting

 \end{itemize}


\end{itemize}

\newpage

{\bf  List of Games} (in order of appearance for now)
%-----------Chapter 1

The Dry Cleaners Game\\
The Prisoner’s Dilemma\\
The Battle of the Bismarck Sea\\
The Iteration Path Game\\
 Boxed Pigs\\
The Modeller’s Dilemma\\
The Battle of the Sexes\\
 Ranked Coordination\\
 Dangerous Coordination\\
A Sequential Prisoner’s Dilemma\\
Follow-the-Leader I\\
Follow-the-Leader II\\
Follow-the-Leader III\\
The Png Settlement Game\\
 Joint Ventures\\
The Welfare Game\\
  Chicken\\
The War of Attrition\\
Grab the Dollar\\
The Patent Race for a New Market\\
The Civic Duty Game\\
Auditing Game I\\
Auditing Game II\\
Auditing Game III\\
 The Swiss Cheese Game\\
The Cournot Game\\
The Stackelberg Game\\
The Bertrand Game\\
The Differentiated Bertrand Game\\
Matching Pennies\\
A Voting Paradox\\
Alba and Rome\\
  Risky Skating\\
The Tremble Game\\
Entry Deterrence I\\
Nuisance Suits I\\
Nuisance Suits II \\
Nuisance Suits III\\
The Pareto Perfection Puzzle\\
  Repeated Entry Deterrence \\
The Three-Way Duel \\
Heresthetics in Pliny and the Freedmens’ Trial\\
The Garbage Entry\\
 Voting Cycles\\
The Chainstore Paradox\\
The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma\\
  Product Quality\\
 Customer Switching Costs\\
  Hawk-Dove\\
The Utopian Exchange Economy Game\\
The Hawk-Dove-Bourgeois Game\\
  Overlapping Generations\\
  Product Quality with Lawsuits\\
A Benoit-Krishna Game\\
  Repeated Entry Deterrence\\
 Entry Deterrence II\\
 Entry Deterrence III\\
 The PhD Admissions Game\\
 Entry Deterrence IV\\
 Entry Deterrence V\\
 The Gang of Four Model\\
 The Diamond Model\\
 Production Game I\\
 Production Game II\\
 Production Game III\\
 Production Game IV\\
 Production Game V\\
 Broadway Game I\\
 Broadway Game II\\
 The Lucky Executive Game\\
 Repossession Game I\\
 Repossession Game II\\
 Insurance Game I\\
 Insurance Game II\\
 Multitasking I\\
 Multitasking II\\
   %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
 %----------Chapter 9
   Production Game VI\\
    Lemons I\\
   Lemons II\\
  Lemons III \\
  Lemons IV\\
  Insurance Game III\\
  The Bagehot Model\\
  The Kyle Model\\
  Production Game VII\\
   %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
 %----------Chapter 10
  Production Game VIII\\
  The Myerson Trading Game\\
  The Salesman Game\\
  The Streetlight Game\\
  Varian’s Nonlinear Pricing Game\\
   Procurement I\\
    Procurement II\\
    Procurement III\\
   %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
  The Right To Silence Game\\
  %----------Chapter 11
  Underpricing New Stock Issues\\
  Limit Pricing as Signal Jamming\\
  Countersignalling\\
  %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
 %----------Chapter 12
 Splitting a Pie
 One-Period Bargaining with Incomplete Information\\
 Two-Period Bargaining with Incomplete Information\\
 Bilateral Trading I\\
 Bilateral Trading II\\
 Bilateral Trading III\\
 Bilateral Trading IV\\
  %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
 %----------Chapter 13
 The Ten-Sixteen Auction\\
 The Continuous-Value Auction\\
 The Dollar Auction\\
 The Uniform-Signal Common-Value Auction\\
 The Wallet Game\\
  %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
 %----------Chapter 14
 The Bertrand Game with Capacity Constraints\\
 The Edgeworth Paradox\\
 The Hotelling Pricing Game\\
 Vertical Differentiation I\\
 Vertical Differentiation II\\
 Vertical Differentiation III\\
 Durable Monopoly
  %------Below games are from end of chapter problems
  Differentiated Bertrand with Advertising\\
  Asymmetric Cournot Duopoly\\









 \end{document}

