Diagrams for Games and Information

This will link you to files for the figures in the 4th edition of Games and Information These may be downloaded and used for overhead transparencies for teaching. The files print out much better than they look on my browser if not, perhaps, yours.

The figure graphics files are in this directory, or by figure via this page you are reading, or as figures.zip or figures.zipp (large files, about 5M in size).

• Chapter 1, The Rules of the Game
  • The Dry Cleaners Game as a Decision Tree
  • The Dry Cleaners Game as a Game Tree

• Chapter 2, Information
  • 1: Follow-the- Leader I in Extensive Form
  • 2: Ranked Coordination in Extensive Form
  • 3: The Time Line for Stock Underpricing: (a) A Good Time Line; (b) A Bad Time Line
  • 4: Information Sets and Information Partitions
  • 5: Follow-the- Leader II
  • 6: Follow-the- Leader III: Original
  • 7: Follow-the- Leader III: After the Harsanyi Transformation
  • 8: Bayes's Rule
  • 9: The Game Tree for the Png Settlement Game
  • Table 2-03

• Chapter 3, Mixed and Continuous Strategies
  • 1: The Payoffs in Patent Race for a New Market
  • 2: Reaction Curves in The Cournot Game
  • 3: Stackelberg Equilibrium
  • 4: Bertrand Reaction Functions with Differentiated Products
  • 5: Cournot vs. Differentiated Bertrand Reaction Functions (Strategic Substitutes vs. Strategic Complements)
  • 6: Continuous and Discontinuous Reaction Functions
• Chapter 4, Dynamic Games with Symmetric Information
  • 1: Follow the Leader I
  • 2: The Tremble Game: Trembling Hand Versus Subgame Perfectness
  • 3: Entry Deterrence I
  • 4: The Extensive Form for Nuisance Suits
  • 5: The Pareto Perfection Puzzle
• Chapter 5, Reputation and Repeated Games with Symmetric Information
  • 1: The Dimensionality Condition
  • 2: Evolutionary Dynamics in the Hawk-Dove- Bourgeois Game
• Chapter 6, Dynamic Games with Incomplete Information
  • 1: Entry Deterrence II, III, and IV
  • 2: The PhD Admissions Game
  • 3: Entry Deterrence V
  • 4: The Interest Rate over Time
  • 5: The Beer- Quiche Game
• Chapter 7, Moral Hazard: Hidden Actions
  • 1: Categories of Asymmetric Information Models
  • 2: The Efficient Effort Level in Production Game I
  • 3: Three Contracts that Induce Effort
  • 4: Shifting Supports in an Agency Model
• Chapter 8, Further Topics in Moral Hazard
  • 1: Insurance Game I
  • 2: Insurance Game II with Full and Partial Insurance
  • 3: More on Partial Insurance in Insurance Game II
  • 4: Contracts in the Holmstrom Teams Model
• Chapter 9, Adverse Selection
  • 1: An Extensive Form for Lemons I
  • 2: Lemons II: Identical Tastes
  • 3: Lemons III: Buyers Value Cars More Than Sellers
  • 4: Lemons IV: Sellers Valuations Differ
  • 5: Insurance Game III: Nonexistence of a Pooling Equilibrium
  • 6: A Separating Equilibrium for Insurance Game III
  • 7: Curves for Which There is No Equilibrium in Insurance Game III
  • 8: Lemons III When Buyers Value Cars More and the Minimum Quality Is Zero
• Chapter 10, Mechanism Design in Adverse Selection and Post-Contractual Hidden Information
  • 1: The Salesman Game with Curves for Pooling Equilibria
  • 2: Indifference Curves for a Separating Equilibrium
  • 3: Linear and Nonlinear Pricing
  • 4: Perfect Price Discrimination
  • 5: The Varian Nonlinear Pricing Game
  • 6: Marginal versus Average Demand
  • 7: Two Depictions of the Single Crossing Property
  • 8: Why the Expensive Firms Incentive Compatibility Constraint Is Nonbinding
• Chapter 11,Signalling
  • 1: Education VI: No Pooling Equilibrium in a Screening Game
  • 2: Education VII: Neither Separating nor Pooling Pure-Strategy Equilibria in a Screening Game
  • 3: How the Signal Changes with the Variance
  • 4: Different Ways to Signal a Given Company Value
  • Figure 6
• Chapter 12, Bargaining
  • 1: (a) Nash Bargaining Game; (b) Splitting a Pie
  • 2: Trades in Bilateral Trading II
  • 3: Trade in the one-price equilibrium
  • 4: Trade in the linear equilibrium
• Chapter 13, Auctions
  • 1: Smoothing a Discrete Distribution
  • 2: The Bid Function in an All-Pay Auction with Identical Buyers
  • 3a: Auctions and Marginal Revenue: Reserve Price Needed
  • 3b: Auctions and Marginal Revenue: No Reserve Price Needed
  • 4: Extracting Information From Uniformly Distributed Signals
• Chapter 14, Pricing
  • 1: Different Demand Curves
  • 2: Multiple Cournot-Nash Equilibria
  • 3: Rationing Rules when pb = 30, etc.
  • 4: Location Models
  • 5: Numerical Examples for Hotelling Pricing
  • 6: Payoffs in the Hotelling Location Game
  • 7: Nonexistence of pure strategies with three players
  • 8: The Equilibrium Mixed-Strategy Density in the Three-Player Location Game
  • 9: The Equilibrium Mixing Density for Location
  • 10: Equilibrium versus Efficiency
  • 11: The Buyers Marginal Benefit per Period in the Game of Durable Monopoly
• Mathematical Appendix
  • 1: Concavity and Convexity
  • 2: Upper Semicontinuity
  • 3: A mapping with three fixed points
  • 4: Discounting
  • 5: Mean Preserving Spreads
  • Figure 6