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    {\large {\bf Sample page for indexing } \\ }

 
6 July 2006

 

Eric Rasmusen,erasmuse@indiana.edu

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To make an index:

Put makeidx in the documentstyle. This does not seem to work with documentclass.

Put in the index entries, like this:$\backslash$index\{this\} or
that$\backslash$index\{words!that\}.

 Put in $\backslash$makeindex before     $\backslash$begin\{document\}

 Put $\backslash$printindex where the index should appear.

Run the file through pdflatex. This will create the file myfile.idx from your
input file myfile.tex.

 Then run makeindex \$Basename, to process the *.idx file.  Or run makeindex
filename.idx if you like  This will create the file myfile.ind.

Then run the original file through pdflatex again. The index will appear in the
final output, myfile.pdf. Also, somewhere during the process the file myfile.ilg
will appear.  You don't need to do anything with myfile.idx, myfile.ind, and
myfile.ilg, but don't erase them.

Or: 1. Put termhere$\backslash$label\{termhere\}, and then for the index,
write termhere $\backslash$pageref\{termhere\} to get the page number on which
termhere
appears.

 


Here begins some text just to illustrate indexing. 
Suppose a bidder\index{bidder} must decide whether and when to incur the cost of
estimating his own  private value in an auction. This can explain why a bidder
might increase his bid ceiling in the course of an auction, and why a bidder
would like to know the private values\index{people!private values} of other
bidders.  See Ye (2006a)\label{ye2006a}


 

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It also  can explain sniping\index{people!sniping}-- flurries of bids at the end
of    auctions\index{auctions} with deadlines-- as the result of other bidders
trying to avoid stimulating the uninformed bidder\index{people!bidder}  to
examine  his value. Again, see Ye (2006a)\label{ye2006a2}


 Value discovery is not   the only way to explain such things as updating of
bids, pre-emptive bids, and sniping.  For explaining pre-emptive bids, value
discovery will  merely  repeat in a new context the well-known explanation that
entry costs-including the cost of valuing the object--  can make pre-emptive
bids valuable (Michael Fishman [1988], David Hirshleifer \& Ivan Png [1989]). A
variety of papers try to explain sniping,   based on common values (Patrick
Bajari \&  Ali Hortacsu [2000]), uncertainty over whether late bids will be
registered by the auctioneer (Alvin Roth  and Axel Ockenfels [2001]), and
irrationality (Deepak Malhotra \& Keith Murnighan [2000]).  And the cost of
returning to bid in an auction that takes place over several days has been shown
by Octavian Carare and  Michael  Rothkopf (2001) to make open-cry Dutch private
auctions not equivalent to sealed-bid auctions.


In the model of  Dan  Levin and James Smith (1994)    bidders
simultaneously decide whether to pay a certain amount to learn  their private
values and enter the auction. Levin and Smith calculate    how many bidders will
enter and compare it with what is best for efficiency and the seller. In the
present paper, discovery will occur during the auction, raising the opportunity
for strategic behavior by other bidders. Roland Guzman and Charles Kolstad
(1999) also construct a model of a private-value auction with possible
information acquisition, but since they look at a sealed-bid auction, timing is
unimportant. In a different style,  Nicola Persico (2000) has studied the
efficiency of incentives to acquire information, and shows that with independent
private values the Vickrey mechanism is efficient.\footnote{Information
acquisition in common value auctions is a separate topic,  since it  has a
public good aspect. See Donald Hausch and Lode Li (1993) for such a model.}



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\noindent
{\bf References}

Ye, Lixin (2001a) ``Optimal Auctions with Endogenous Entry,'' working
paper, Ohio State
Dept. of Economics (June 1, 2001). \pageref{ye2006a} \pageref{ye2006a2}


Ye, Lixin (2001b) ``Indicative Bidding,'' working paper, Ohio State
Dept. of Economics (July 1, 2001).


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