Ostracism in Japan

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Abstract: For most communities, informal social sanctions like ostracism serve as the primary means of controlling deviance. Formal legal sanctions represent a costlier backup. Yet outside university laboratories, studies of ostracism barely exist. We construct a formal model and examine legal cases brought by targets of ostracism in Japan. Villagers who have actually offended their community tend not to bring these suits. Instead, the plaintiffs are generally victims of opportunistic ostracism -- cases where a group used the sanction to extort property, hide communitywide malfeasance, or harass their rivals. Typically, the plaintiffs are not trying to harness the government’s coercive power. Instead, they sue to have the court publicly certify that they were not really culpable.

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It happened in 1952 in a small village at the base of Mt. Fuji (Case 1). For years, a village leader had gone house to house asking residents whether they planned to use their election ticket, the form that enabled them to vote. If not, he asked if they could give it to him lest it go to waste.

Teenager Satsuki Ishikawa thought this outrageous. Still in middle school, she wrote an article about this electoral fraud for her school newspaper. School administrators collected every copy of the issue and destroyed them. Two years later, she decided to try again. She could not complain to city hall, since the man collecting the tickets worked there. She thought of complaining to the electoral commission, but worried that they might be in on the scheme. She considered the police, but she did not trust them either. Instead, she wrote to the national Asahi newspaper. The paper sent reporters to the village, and the electoral fraud hit the national news. The police arrested the guilty village leaders. The community responded by ostracizing the Ishikawa family.

Readers of the Asahi wrote in from around the country in support of Satsuki Ishikawa. Her teachers and classmates encouraged her. But the Ishikawa family raised rice. In the pre-mechanized 1950s, transplanting rice required community assistance. When the time came to transplant the Ishikawa fields, no one came to help.¹

Both in sociology and in economics, scholars have treated informal social sanctions as a community's primary mechanism for controlling deviance. They have treated formal legal sanctions -- both civil and criminal -- as a more costly secondary mechanism. Among the informal sanctions, scholars have described ostracism as one of the most severe. Yet outside of the psychology laboratory, studies of actual cases of ostracism barely exist.

We construct a formal model of ostracism, and examine legal cases brought over ostracism in modern Japan. Some are civil, and some criminal. We find very few cases where a community used ostracism to try to control a deviant member who had engaged in anti-social behavior. Instead, most cases involved disputes in which the community itself

¹ E.g., Watashi wa machigatte imasuka? [Am I wrong], Asahi shimbun, June 23, 1952; Saeki san yuki wo motte ... [Be Courageous, Satsuki,” Asahi Shimbun, June 29, 1952; other sources on the internet.
used ostracism opportunistically -- to shield community-wide misconduct, for example, to extract property from a member, or to harass a rival faction. The plaintiffs filing these cases did not primarily bring them for damages (or prosecutors, for criminal sanctions). Instead, they seem to have brought them for informational purposes: to have the court publicly certify their version of the events.

We begin by exploring the scholarly literature on formal and informal sanctions on deviance, and specifically on ostracism (Sec. I). We introduce a formal model of the interaction between ostracism and its judicial review in Sec. II. We describe our sample of modern Japanese ostracism disputes (Secs. III, IV), and conclude with a discussion of our findings (Sec. V).

I. Formal and Informal Sanctions

As scholars, we picture ostracism as an informal social sanction on deviant behavior, and crime as a subset of deviance. Among the many informal sanctions that a community can impose, we picture ostracism as among the most severe. We picture informal sanctions as a community's primary sanction against deviance, and formal criminal and civil litigation as a secondary sanction to use when someone fails to respond to those informal measures.

Durkheim classically presented deviance as a phenomenon that communities worked to constrain through their networks of informal ties. The communities did not "control" an individual as much as -- in Bernard's (1995, 85) words -- provide a "structure of self-interest ... such that people find it in their interest" to follow community norms.

Differently, but just as classically, Merton explained deviance as the result of an incompatibility between the socially prescribed life (cultural goals), and an individual's inability to attain it (institutional means). As Hirschi & Rudisill (1976, 19) described the logic: "While all are led to believe there is 'room at the top,' in fact there is not room for all .... In such a situation, ... the disadvantaged to engage in criminal behavior as the only available means of attaining it."

Sutherland pushed sociologists to shift their attention from the individual to the society. Sutherland largely abandoned Durkheim's focus on individual-level factors. Instead (in the words of Laub & Sampson, 1991, p. 1420), "crime was viewed by Sutherland as a social
phenomenon that could only be explained by social (i.e., non-individual) factors."

At the opposite extreme from Sutherland, Gary Becker brought a deliberately spare model of crime that turned exclusively on the individual. Scholars would do best, he argued, to posit a potential criminal who weighed his private benefit from a crime against his expected costs, and chose crime when the net result was positive (Becker, 1968, p. 176).

Although Becker focused on legal (particularly criminal) sanctions, modern scholars in the economic tradition focus not just on the legal rules but on the informal sanctions that can cause people to desist from crime as well. The literature is massive, but the classics include Landa (xx, xx), Greif (xx, xx), Ellickson (xxxx, xxx), Bernstein (xxx, xxx). Like many sociologists, they observe the way citizens help preserve public safety and order through informal social sanctions. They note how citizens use these sanctions to enforce norms of desirable behavior. "To some extent," write Polinsky & Shavell (2006), social sanctions "are substitutes for public law enforcement."

One of the more surprising conclusions from the Japanese ostracism cases in Section III below is the extent to which almost none of them seems to fit the literature we have just reviewed. The ostracism cases that appear in court are not about bringing social pressure to prevent anti-social conduct. Instead, they are more often about using collective pressure to enforce the interests of the narrow collectivity against the broader social good, or to enable some community members to benefit at the expense of others.

For example, a community can use ostracism to coerce its members into behaving in ways that promote the interests of the community at the expense of the larger society. It might, for example, seek to evade national fishing restrictions for the sake of its local fishing households. In the process, it will need to ensure that no one locally reports the truth to the broader community or to the national government.

Alternatively, segments of the local community can use ostracism to transfer wealth and other perquisites from other members of the community. They might, for example, route highways and access roads in locally biased ways. And in all such processes again, it will need to ensure that no one locally reports the truth to outside world.
Scholars have written almost nothing about actual cases of ostracism in modern societies. Experimental psychologists, however, have been actively exploring how people react to it. Over the course of the past two decades, they have conducted a wide variety of experiments on ostracism. The bulk of the studies have been associated in one way or another with Kipling Williams at Purdue; literature reviews can be found in Nezlek, Wesselmann, Wheeler & Williams (2012); Sebastian, Viding, Williams & Blakemore (2010); Williams (2007). A few scholars have looked at the Amish practice of “shunning,” e.g., Gruter 1986. Scattered ethnographies detail practices in hunter-gather societies, e.g., Zippelius (1986); Soederberg & Fry (2017).

Ironically, of the very few studies of ostracism in any modern democracy, perhaps the best is the sixty-year-old study by anthropologist Robert J. Smith (1961) of ostracism in Japan. His analysis focused on documentary evidence from eight cases: refusing to help maintain a footbridge, stealing millet, publicizing election fraud (the schoolgirl of our Case 1), violating a village rest day to engage in a building project, stealing potatoes, falsely claiming to police that village authorities had cut down a tree the target owned, and (in 1937) refusing to join in the celebratory send-off of an army draftee. Only the last of these resulted in a lawsuit.

II. A Formal Model:
Ostracism has been modelled using game theory in various highly abstract contexts, as the idea that if one member of a group offends, the other members refuse to engage in mutually profitable interactions with him (e.g., D. Hirshleifer & Rasmusen (1989), Ali & Miller (2016)). Usually the focus is on how the group incentivizes individual members to ostracize the target by, for example, ostracizing the non-ostracizer, and the problems created by the resulting infinite chain of penalties. Here, we will put the problem of how the villages enforces ostracism aside to focus on mistaken ostracism and the role of courts.

A. The Basic Model:
Consider a simple model to addresses several of the situations which can arise:
(a) a villager whose actions hurt everybody but him;
(b) a villager who hurts the village but helps society;
(c) a villager who helps the village but hurts society;
(d) a villager who is mistakenly believed to have hurt the village; and
(e) other variations on the basic situation of ostracism.

We wish to model a village that might try to deter deviant conduct by a target member using ostracism, and a broader society that establishes a court system which may or may not wish to restrict ostracism. Let the payoffs be normalized to zero for each player if the target villager does not deviate, the villagers do not ostracize, and the court does not get involved. The target villager chooses to comply with village custom \((x = 0)\) or offend \((x = 1)\). The village sees evidence indicating that he complied \((y = 0)\) or offended \((y = 1)\). If the target offends, he is always detected: \(\text{Prob}(y=1|x=1) = 1\) (a simplifying assumption). However, if the target complies, the evidence sometimes mistakenly indicates that he offended: \(\text{Prob}(y=1|x=0) = m\), where \(0 < m < 1\).

If the target offends, he obtains personal benefit \(B > 0\) from that act but imposes cost \(C\) on the village and cost \(D\) on the rest of society. The costs and benefits \(B, C,\) and \(D\) are unobserved until much later (otherwise, the villagers could look at them to determine whether the target had offended). The village can either continue to associate with the target, or ostracize him at cost \(Z > 0\) to themselves and impose cost \(P > 0\) on him.

Note that the costs \(C\) and \(D\) need not be positive. If they are, the target’s offending is harmful; if they are negative, his “offending” is beneficial. It could be, for example, that \(C > 0\) and \(D < 0\), which would mean that offending hurts the village but helps outsiders, as with reporting village corruption (Case 1, and, below, Cases 14, 15, 16). If \(B < C + D\), offending is wealth-diminishing for society as a whole -- the sum of target, villagers, court, and outsiders. If \(B > C + D\), offending is wealth-increasing for society as a whole, but still bad for the villagers if \(C > 0\).

At cost \(L\) to himself, the target can take his case to court. At cost \(J\) to the outside world, the court can agree to hear it, to decide whether or not the target truly offended, and to announce its decision publicly (as discussed in Sec. IV.C.).

Whether or not the target has gone to court, the model then moves to a second period: the long-term. The village
decides if it wants to keep ostracizing the target, in
which case the costs are incurred a second time: $Z$ for the
village and $P$ for the target.

In interpreting the model, note that it is unimportant
that we have assumed that a target who has truly offended
is detected by the village with probability one and that
the court never makes mistakes. While descriptively
unrealistic, adding parameters to incorporate these sources
of error would make no significant difference to the model
or our conclusions.

Note also that although in the model the village “sees
evidence” and “detects” offending, in application the
source of the villagers’ error is not always in deciding
whether the target took action $X$ or not. Instead,
sometimes the error is in whether it was appropriate for
the target to take action $X$. In Ueno Village, there was no
doubt that Satsuki Ishikawa had written on corruption for
the school newspaper and then spilled the story to the
national newspaper. What was less clear, however, was
whether this was an offense against the village or a noble
act, whether it would hurt the village or help it. In other
cases, too, villagers need to decide not just what the
facts were, but whether those facts constitute an offense
or not. As phrased in the legal world, there are “mistakes
of fact”—false conclusions about what happened—and
“mistakes of law”—false conclusions about whether what
happened violated the rules. Concluding that the defendant
killed someone when he did not is a mistake of fact;
concluding that killing someone in clear self-defense is
murder under the law of the State of Indiana is a mistake
of law.

B. The Outcome:

Consider three regimes: (1) No-Penalty, (2)
Unconstrained Ostracism, and (3) Constrained Ostracism. We
will compute the payoffs under these regimes and compare
them to see which regimes would be chosen by the village
and which by the court. In this exercise, we assume that
the target maximizes his own utility, the other villagers
maximize the sum of their utilities, and the court
maximize the sum of the utilities of everyone in society:
i.e., the utilities of the target (amounts $B$, $P$, and $J$),
the villagers (amounts $C$ and $Z$), people outside the village
(amount $D$), and the public court costs (amount $J$). Note
that each type of norm violation by the target will have
its own values for each of these parameters, and it is
quite possible to have different regimes for different
offenses. Reporting corruption, refusing to give up land for a road, and murder will differ in their parameter values, and that will be related to how the village and the courts react to them differently.

(1) **The No-Penalty Regime. Villagers Do Not Ostracize.**

(a) The villagers never ostracize anyone.

The no-penalty regime is the base case. The target will offend, for a payoff of $B$, since he incurs no penalty for doing so. The villagers will have an aggregate payoff of $-C$. The court has no role. Society’s overall welfare is $B - C - D$.

(2) **The Unconstrained Ostracism Regime: Villagers Ostracize; the Court Refuses to Hear Ostracism Cases**

(a) The villagers ostracize if they see evidence of deviant behavior.

(b) The court refuses to hear any ostracism case brought before it, ruling that ostracism is never illegal.

Under unconstrained ostracism, the target’s expected payoff will be $-2mP$ if he complies, since with probability $m$ he will be ostracized by mistake in both periods. If he offends, it will be $B - 2P$, since he will definitely be detected (under the model’s assumptions) and he will be ostracized. Thus, he will comply if and only if $-2mP > B - 2P$, which is true if $B < 2P(1-m)$; that is, if the reward from offending is small compared with the ostracism penalty and if the probability of mistaken ostracism is small enough. Note that if the probability of mistaken ostracism is high enough, the target will offend even if his benefit is small, because he can expect to be ostracized whether he really offends or not. Overzealous punishment results in noncompliance.

The village’s expected payoff depends on what the target does, so it depends on $B$, $P$, and $m$. If $B < 2P(1-m)$ then the target complies and the village’s payoff is $-2mZ$, the cost of mistaken ostracism. If $B > 2P(1-m)$ then the target offends and the village’s payoff is $-C - 2P$.

Compare the village’s payoff in the no-ostracism regime with the unconstrained ostracism regime. If $B < 2P(1-m)$, the village benefits from having the ostracism
regime if \(-2mZ > -C\), which is true if \(2mZ < C\). Hence the first proposition:

**Proposition 1:** The village prefers the ostracism regime if it does effectively deter and if the cost of mistaken ostracism is small relative to the cost from the offense.

On the other hand, if \(B > 2P(1-m)\), ostracism fails to deter and the target offends anyway. In that case, the ostracism regime is clearly worse for the village, because it just adds the cost of inflicting ostracism to the cost of the offense. Punishing offenders is worse than useless if it fails to deter.

We add detail to the simple statement in Proposition 1a.

**Proposition 1a:** In the absence of courts, villages will adopt a custom of ostracizing people who commit offenses --

that impose a relatively high cost on the village (high \(C\)) but have a relatively low benefit to the target (low \(B\)), but only if the evidence for that kind of offense is reliable enough (low \(m\)) and the cost to other villagers of ostracizing someone is not too high (low \(Z\)) while the cost to the target is high enough to deter him (high \(P\)).

**Case 2** below will be an example of this: ostracism of the target for refusing to join fellow villagers in giving up land to construct a road that would benefit them all. Proposition 1 implies that ostracism will be used for relatively minor offenses, not major ones. It is not suitable for dealing with a villager who steals his neighbor’s stash of coins. That offense is profitable for the target (high \(B\)), unimportant to everyone except the victim (low \(C\)), and false accusations can easily be made since the deed is secret (high \(m\)). For such offenses, villages need government courts and official penalties such as fines or jail.

In the unconstrained ostracism regime, society’s payoff will depend on whether or not ostracism deters. On the one hand, if \(B > 2P(1-m)\), the target offends, so the sum of everyone’s payoffs is his \(B - 2P\) plus the village’s \(-C - 2Z\), plus outsiders’ \(-D\), a total of \(B - C - D - 2(P + \)
Z). Under the no-ostracism regime, total welfare is \( B - C - D \). Thus, social welfare is lower by amount \( 2(P + Z) \) with unconstrained ostracism—since it fails to deter, all it does is impose costs on society.

On the other hand, if \( B < 2P(1-m) \), the target complies, so the sum of everyone’s payoffs is his \(-2mP\) plus the village’s \(-2mZ\), a total of \(-2m(P + Z)\). Under the no-ostracism regime, total welfare is \( B - C - D \). Thus, social welfare is higher with unconstrained ostracism if \(-2m(P + Z) > B - C - D\); that is, if the cost of mistaken ostracism to target and village is less than the offense’s benefit to the target minus its cost to the village minus its cost to outsiders.

In sum: if ostracism fails to deter offending, it merely imposes costs and it hurts the village and society. As a result, we would not expect it to persist as a social custom unless we introduce something new, not in the model --- for example, manipulation of the problem of group action for private gain (e.g., Case 13 below), or the need to have ostracism for either all offenses or none rather than just for the kind of offences it can deter. On the other hand, if ostracism does deter, it can increase village and societal welfare, depending on how accurate and costly it is, and whether the “offense” really is harmful to the village and to outsiders.

(3) The Constrained Ostracism Regime: Villagers Ostracize; Court Hears Cases; Villagers Listen to the Court

(a) The villagers ostracize if they see evidence of deviant behavior.
(b) The court hears any case brought before it.
(c) The villagers end ostracism if the court declares the target did not deviate.

Regime (3) introduces court intervention. Under unconstrained ostracism, the court either does not exist or exists but refuses to hear ostracism cases. In the constrained ostracism regime, it does hear cases, it declares the truth of whether the target offended, and the villagers cease to ostracize if the target did not offend. This models the standard idea that not all wrong are “legal wrongs”. In England and in most U.S. states, for example, people consider adultery to be immoral, a wrong, but it is not illegal (see Rasmusen, 2002). The adulterer faces neither civil nor criminal sanctions, though it is generally thought that adultery is wrong. Society has made
the decision that this wrong is not one appropriate for redress in the courts, for a variety of reasons. Even so, Japanese courts and those in other countries might decide that ostracism was not something that court remedies could help with enough to be worth court costs, and so turn away anyone asking for such remedies even before inquiring into whether the offence really occurred.

In this regime, the target may or may not choose to comply, as we will shortly discuss, depending on the parameter values. The villagers will sometimes observe apparent offending even if he does comply, and when they observe it they will ostracize the target. The target may or may not go to court if he complies and is unjustly ostracized, depending on his legal cost, \( L \), but if he does, he is always vindicated.

Consider the target's payoff. If he offends, his maximized payoff is his personal benefit \( B \) minus his cost of being ostracized for two periods, \( 2P \), for a total of \( B - 2P \). If he were to go to court, he would lose and just subtract \( L \) from his payoff. If he complies instead of offending, and he goes to court if he is ostracized, his payoff is made up of the expected cost of one period of ostracism, \(-mP\), minus the cost of going to court, \( L \).

Because he will be vindicated, however, he avoids the second period of ostracism and his overall payoff is \(-mP - L\). If he complies but does not bother going to court, his ostracism continues, so his payoff is \(-2mP\). Thus, he will choose to go to court if \( L < mP \).

Consequently, the target will compare his offending payoff of \( B - 2P \) with his complying payoff of \( \max(-mP - L, -2mP) \). On the one hand, if legal costs are high \( (L > mP) \), he will offend if \( B - 2P > 2mP \). In this case, the existence of the court is irrelevant since it is too expensive to use, and we are back to the same outcome as in the unconstrained ostracism regime; the court exists and is now willing to hear ostracism cases, but access to justice is too expensive so the result is the same as if it refused to hear cases. Thus, we can immediately conclude that for offenses complicated enough to require costly legal proceedings, the equilibrium payoffs end up being the same as in the unconstrained ostracism regime and we can refer back to those results for our explanation of what village custom will be and whether it is a good outcome for society.

On the other hand, if legal costs are low \( (L < mP) \), the target will offend if \( B - 2P > -mP - L \). We will continue our analysis assuming that legal costs are low, so
the target will go to court if unjustly ostracized. First, consider the village's payoff. If the target complies, the village sometimes ostracizes him unjustly, but for just one period, so its payoff is \(-mZ\). If the target offends, that hurts the village directly plus it ostracizes for two periods, so the village payoff is \(-C - 2Z\).

Second, consider society's payoff, which is what the court cares about. If the target complies, we must subtract the public's cost of the court, \(J\), from the sum of his payoff, \(-mP - L\), and the village's payoff, \(-mZ\), for an overall social welfare of \(-J - L - m(P + Z)\).

Thus, if the target offends, the implications for aggregate social welfare are composed of the target's payoff, \(B - 2P\); the villager's payoff, \(-C - 2Z\); and the harm to outsiders, \(-D\); for social welfare of \(B - D - 2(P + Z)\).

C. The Social Preference:

This discussion takes us to the question of whether the village and court prefer Unconstrained Ostracism or Constrained Ostracism. Stripped of details and qualifications, the former is closer to the U.S. regime, while the latter is closer to the Japanese (and Whitman's European regime; see Sec. IV).

If the target's personal benefit \(B\) is high enough, the target is going to offend no matter what. Ostracism fails to deter, and the courts are unimportant. In that case, the no-ostracism rule is best for the village and for society. This sounds bad, but if \(B\) is large and \(C\) and \(D\) (the costs to village and outsiders) are also large, society can simply turn to criminal law, which lies outside our model. Hence Proposition 2:

**Proposition 2:** When a villager has violated custom and obtained enormous benefits for himself at the expense of enormous costs for his village and the outside world, the offense is criminalized.

If the offense benefits the target enough, ostracism is insufficient to deter. Instead, the court puts him in jail and prosecutes him. Failing that, the village engages in self-help: it does not just ostracize, but lynches him—though that is outside of our model, except for the fact that ostracism would fail to deter. Lynching would appear in our model as mathematically very similar to ostracism—but with a vastly higher cost to the target (the \(P\) value) (on sanctions with different costs to the target, see Sec.
IV). It poses analogous disadvantages -- potential mistaken
terpretation of the facts (high m), and breakdowns
resulting from collective action problems. In societies
without strong state capacity, villages do often make use
of lynching: think medieval Europe, frontier America, or —
perhaps, if news accounts are to be believed -- modern
village India (How WhatsApp, 2018).
For seriously harmful offenses, but not offences so
useful to the target that ostracism would fail to deter, a
society will prefer a regime in which the courts review
ostracism:

Proposition 3:
If \( C > 0 \) (the offense harms the village),

and \( D > 0 \) or \( D = 0 \) (the offense harms outsiders or
leaves them unaffected), and

if the cost to the public of hearing cases, \( J \), is not
too high,

then both village and society prefer constrained
ostracism to unconstrained: court intervention is valuable.

The villagers know that sometimes they wrongly
conclude that an innocent target has misbehaved. They know
they are not as accurate as adversary proceedings before an
intelligent judge (and Japanese judges are extremely able—
one reason why they are so expensive; see Ramseyer &
Rasmusen 2001, 2003). They know that judges are skilled in
weighing evidence and have the benefit of hearing both
sides of the story. The villagers are happy to cease
ostracizing (and save the cost \( Z \)) once they learn the
truth. And since the target knows that any ostracism will
be only temporary if he complies, he will comply rather
than give up and decide to be truly as bad as they would
think anyway by mistake. Increased accuracy helps
everybody—as long as it is not too expensive. This is
Blanchard’s theory of international law (see Sec. IV): a
court may not be able to enforce its judgements against
foreigners, but if is respected for its neutrality,
foreigners will believe its conclusions and act
accordingly, and the target will obtain its relief.

For many offences, the Constrained Ostracism Regime
also dominates a fourth regime that one might call the No-
Ostracism Criminal Law Regime. In this regime, villages
would not ostracize, but could choose to take an offender
to court (at some cost). At that point, the court would
not just determine what was true, but could impose a
penalty on the target (something not in the above model). The potential superiority of the Constrained or Unconstrained Ostracism regimes over this fourth possibility is that they are cheap. Village gossip may not be as accurate as court proceedings, but it is quick and low-cost. For modest offenses, a cheap and quick process will often dominate more accurate but costly regimes.

It is worth noting one unintuitive implication of the model: if the village is somewhat inaccurate in its assessment of deviance, but not too inaccurate, the possibility of court review actually increase the usefulness of ostracism as a social tool. If courts did not exist, then inaccurate village ostracism would lead to so many mistakes that over time we would expect thriving villages to abandon ostracism as a tool for social control. Recall: inaccurate ostracism results both in injustice and in harm to the village from a punishment that imposes costs on the village as well as on the target. If, however, there exists the possibility of the target going to court, the village does not need to worry so much about unjust and village-harming ostracism. If the ostracism is unjust, the target will go to court, the court will inform the village of that fact, and the village will relent. Mistaken ostracism will be costly for one period, but not for two. Thus, the presence of the court will, by the very fact that it limits ostracism, increase its usage.

D. Intra-Village Disputes:

In the formal model, we have treated “the village” as a single player. In reality, a village is a group of individuals. This is important for two reasons: it hinders information, and it hinders action. What the model shows is what the village would do if it could overcome these problems, without the distraction and complication of showing their impact. We will now discuss them.

The information problem is already in our model, in reduced form, because the village sometimes mistakenly believes the target has offended when he has not. Mistakes like that arise even at the individual level, but they are compounded at the group level. Our model simplifies even at the individual level, because it assumes a fixed probability of mistake, whereas the individual villager makes a choice about how carefully to investigate and how much time to spend thinking about whether the target has offended. One implication of our model is that if the courts are available to remedy mistaken ostracism, the village will ostracize for offenses about which it is more
likely to make mistakes. Another implication is that if the village chooses the level of care with which it decides whether the target has offended, it will choose a lower level if the court is there to fix its mistakes.

If we think about the village as a group of individuals, each making his own decision as to whether the target really offended, the village needs to have a decision rule as to when to ostracize. If there are 50 villagers, and 30 of them think the target offended but 20 do not, what does the village do? For our purposes, what matters is the probability that the rule ends up with a mistaken result. Our model implicitly says that the rule is never mistaken if the target really did offend. That is entirely a simplifying assumption, which we could change without changing our conclusions in any important way, merely complicating the analysis. It also implicitly says that the rule adopted results in the village as a group deciding to ostracize mistakenly with probability \( m \) when the target really is innocent.

If our purpose was to model ostracism per se rather than to understand ostracism’s relation to government courts and to look at Japan in particular, we would want to delve into the optimal village decision rule, developing the theoretical game theory literature on collective action problems that D. Hirshleifer & Rasmusen (1989) exemplifies. Here, that would distract, and what is useful is to lay out what is relevant to the interaction between the courts and the ostracizing body of individuals. Erroneous ostracism is central to that.

Beyond the mere existence of error, however, what is most important is to note that the village as a group rather than individual is especially prone to error. The village as an entity, not a group, would choose an optimal effort level with which to investigate possible offending by the target. It might choose, for example, that each villager spend one hour investigating, listening, and thinking about the target, and then adopt the conclusion of the majority. Or, it might choose to have three villagers each spend 10 hours, and to have the rest of the villagers adopt the opinion of the majority of those three, which would save effort.

Either of those investigation and decision rules, or of the infinite number of other possibilities, faces the problems of redundancy, free riders, and bias. If more than one villager investigates and ponders, there is duplicated effort. Whether it is one villager or all, each villager who is supposed to exert effort will be tempted to slack
off, since he bears all the cost of his effort but he shares the benefit with everyone else. And each villager has a bias towards or against the target, and so delegating the investigation is fraught with the danger that he will report back wrongly. This could all be modelled mathematically, but the upshot is that villages are likely to make mistakes, and the villagers all know that. The court, with less redundancy, free riding, and bias, has a huge advantage in accuracy.

Before leaving the topic of information, however, we should mention the problem of informational cascades. With over 8,000 cites on Google Scholar to its leading article (Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer, and Welch, 1992), this phenomenon has many complexities. We can illustrate it here, though, with a simple formal example. Suppose a village consists of the target and 20 villagers, and they decide in sequence whether to say that he is guilty of an offense against village custom. Villager Ichi starts with no information, and must decide how much effort to use investigating the rumor, effort which is costly to him in time and energy. He makes a decision on how much to investigate, uncovers some evidence, and reaches the conclusion that the target is guilty, which he announces. Villager Ni now must decide how much to investigate. He already knows that Ichi investigated, so Ni will rely partly on Ichi’s conclusion, partly on his own investigation—and he probably will decide not to spend as much effort, since he can do some free riding off of Ichi. Suppose he, too, decides the target is guilty, and announces it. It is now Villager San’s turn to investigate, with even less motivation to be thorough, and this continues with all 20 villagers. The insight of cascade theory is that even if everybody understands what is going on, this can easily reach a perverse result. It may happen that Ichi’s investigation leaves him with 51% confidence that the target is guilty, but what he communicates will not be a full written report with footnotes and transcripts—he will just say “Guilty”. Villager Ni might also, with his weaker effort, find a 51% probability and say “Guilty”. At that point, having heard Ichi and Ni say “Guilty”, suppose San’s still weaker investigation turns up a 90% probability that the target is innocent. What will San do? He does not know that Ichi and Ni were on the fence, barely believing the target guilty: all he knows is that they concluded “Guilty”. Thus, quite rationally, he may disregard his own findings (which he knows are based on less effort) and also say, “Guilty”. The other 16
villagers, having seen unanimity from the first three, may also each say “Guilty” in sequence, even if each of them decides that his own, unreliable, evidence, would indicate a 90% probability of innocence. The target is ostracized even though 18 of the 20 villagers believed, based on his personal findings, that he was innocent. This perverse result is the big insight of cascade theory. If the villagers could pool their information, instead of proceeding sequentially, they would reach a completely different conclusion.

Thus, it is quite plausible that “village opinion” would often be unreliable. Showing this mathematically requires some sophistication—and we refer readers to the original papers for a rigorous demonstration—but villagers around the world are quite aware of the proposition that gossip is unreliable. Knowing it is unreliable is no escape: gossip is sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and the problem is inherent in a “telephone game” system where information is collected by volunteers and spread through “coarse” signals. Where there is smoke, there is fire — usually, but (and this is the big problem) not always.

Poor information due to a collective-action problem of free riding in information collection in one problem. The second collective-action problem lies in enforcing ostracism. If villager Ichi ostracizes an offender, Ichi is hurting himself as well as the offender. Ichi benefits from having a relationship of reciprocal help with the target. Both of them benefit when they share tools, help each other at harvest, exchange news about crop conditions, take care of each other’s children playing. Punishing the target may help the village as a whole, but Ichi would prefer it if the rest of the village did the costly ostracism and he got to keep interacting with the target. Each villager agrees that it would be better if everybody else ostracized the target, not himself.

This free rider problem has been studied in the economics literature, and the solution to it is to ostracize not just the target, but anybody who fails to ostracize the target. And, of course, an infinite regress is required: if the target offends, then Ichi and the others must ostracize him; and if Ichi fails to ostracize him, Ni and the others must ostracize him; and if Ni fails to ostracize the target and Ichi; and if Ni fails to ostracize Ichi, San and the other others must ostracize the target, Ichi, and Ni; and so forth. Formal models are complicated because of the need to address this infinite regress (infinite because of the time dimension, even if there are only 20 villagers). They
boil down to the idea that villagers will ostracize, even at personal cost, if they fear that they themselves will be ostracized if they do not, but that this set of expectations is easy to tip, with many possible equilibria depending on how the expectations arise—including how they are manipulated by the players themselves.

In particular, note that this reasoning does not depend on the target actually being guilty. It does not even depend on him being really thought to be guilty. Recall that any single villager is tempted to free ride and continue social interaction with the target even if he is truly guilty, because the benefit of deterring misbehavior goes to the entire village but the cost of Ichi losing the target’s target’s friendship falls on Ichi alone. Thus started the chain of ostracizing Ichi if he did not ostracize the target.

Suppose, though, that Ichi and the other villagers do not think the target is guilty at all. The ostracism reasoning still works. We can imagine that the villagers have somehow acquired an expectation that anyone who has a leaf fall on his head must be ostracized or the other villagers will ostracize the non-ostracizer. In that case, if a leaf falls on the target’s head, Ichi will ostracize him for fear of being ostracized himself, as will every other villager, even though none of them want it to happen. They are simply caught in a bad equilibrium, a bad set of expectations.

Game theorists have had little success in explaining how expectations arise when there are multiple Nash equilibria. This is the domain of the “focal points” of Schelling (1961), which are essentially a psychological phenomenon. Why, if two people in separate rooms are asked to guess what number the other one will pick from the list (2, 3, 4, 8, 3000) can we expect them both to pick 3000? Why, especially, if we allow them to play the game repeatedly and with communication and say that their reward is zero if they disagree but $X if they both pick X? Pure rationality does not give an answer, but people have a tendency to find their way to an efficient equilibrium. In our formal model, we show what village policy ends up being best for the village, depending on the parameters. We do not say how they actually commit to that policy and make each other abide by it. Implicitly, we suggest that they will end up with the optimal policy by some unmodeled social process, just as we think both people will end up picking 3,000 in the coordination game. Similarly, we have left unmodeled why the court in our model will maximize
social welfare rather than, say, the judge maximizing his own bribe revenue, or taking a perverse delight in sowing discord in villages, or simply refusing all ostracism cases to reduce his own workload regardless of social benefit. How to get judges to do what is good for society is a broader social issue --- see Ramseyer & Rasmusen (2001). How to get politicians to get judges to behave is still broader, and how to get voters to get politicians to get judges to behave is even broader still.

The multiple equilibria of ostracism, however, with its dependence on expectations, raise an issue too important to ignore here: the possibility of manipulation by some villagers for their own good and to the detriment of everyone else. In our earlier example, the bad equilibrium was for villagers to ostracize anyone on whose head a leaf fell. That is unrealistic, because it does hurt everyone and everyone has an incentive to talk the problem out and change the expectation to be that nobody will get punished for not ostracizing victims of falling leaves.

Suppose instead, however, that the bad equilibrium is to ostracize anyone who resists bullying by villager Ichi, and anyone who fails to participate in that ostracism, and— to add something new—anyone who even brings up the subject of trying to change that equilibrium. Maybe nobody else likes this regime, but Ichi does, and if he is clever, he may be able to manipulate expectations so as to bring it about. Once these expectations are in place, Ichi is able to bully anybody he likes, not using his own physical prowess, but the fear of all the other villagers of each other.

It is important to bring Ichi’s bullying because it shows how our formal model’s comparison of different ideal regimes may be misguided, because maybe the village will end up maximizing not the sum of the utilities of the villagers, but the utility of Ichi. If that is the case, it suggests a new reason why the target would go to court and why the court is important even if it is impotent to enforce its rulings and can only declare them. Our reason above is that the villagers know they might be wrong in thinking the target offended, and thus are happy to stop ostracizing him once the court deliberates and declares the truth to them. The new reason is that the villagers know all along that the target is not guilty, but they are caught in Ichi’s web of manipulated expectations and are aching for someone not caught within it to change the expectation. If the court says, “We declare that the target is innocent and that nobody should ostracize him, and of
course nobody should be ostracized for not ostracizing him, and anybody who thinks otherwise is being tricked by Ichi, who is wrong when he says you’ll be punished,” then if the villagers believe that, it will be self-confirming. Ichi’s power will melt away. The court’s usefulness lies in its being outside of the village system, so it can change expectations in a way too dangerous for a villager to attempt.

III. The Cases

A. Conventional Cases:

1. Introduction. -- Several of the ostracism cases (most use the Japanese word "murahachibu") in the published opinions involve innocuous norms, disputes in which members of a community tried to enforce broadly welfare-enhancing norms of behavior. A Supreme Court case from 1921, for example, concerned a rural hamlet that had received subsidies from the larger village (mura) and county (gun) governments to build a road (Case 2). Sadaji Kodama owned part of the land over which the road would pass. He refused to convey it to the community. Whether his objection was that the community wanted more land from him than it took from others; whether it offered them higher compensation than he was offered; whether the road benefited others more than him, we cannot tell from the court opinion. Three times, however, the county head visited Kodama to plead with him, to no avail. After seven or eight years passed and the hamlet had still to finish the road, the county withdrew its subsidy. Furious, hamlet members assembled and voted to cut all ties with Kodama and with anyone -- “whether or not related by blood” -- who might continue to have contact with him. Kodama sued in response, and (as discussed in more detail below), the court called the ostracism a tort.

The Supreme Court faced a similar case in 1939 (Case 3). Here, too, a hamlet planned to expand a road, and here, too, a landowner refused to cooperate. The hamlet needed to remove a hedge at the edge of his property, but the owner refused permission. After long and complicated negotiations involving not just the owner but his grown nephew, community workers started to clear the hedge. The owner called the police, and the community responded by imposing ostracism. In turn, prosecutors brought charges,

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and (as discussed below), the court called the ostracism a crime.

A 1952 case from the Tokyo High Court involved a hamlet's liability to the national government (Case 4). Under the stringent economic controls of the early post-war years, the national government requisitioned rice from farming hamlets (effectively but not formally a tax). Community leaders then allocated that amount among the hamlet members. One of the residents in the 45-household hamlet thought his allocation unfair and refused to provide the full amount demanded. The community responded with ostracism. The farmer sued, and again (discussed below) the court held the ostracism a tort.

Among the reported cases, Japanese courts almost always declared the ostracism illegal. Sometimes police arrested the hamlet leaders, and sometimes the victims themselves sued the leaders. When prosecutors pursued criminal charges, the courts generally convicted those leaders. Section 222 of the Criminal Code made intimidation --- conduct that would "threaten the life, body, freedom, reputation, or property of another" --- a crime. The judges called ostracism criminal intimidation. When victims sued hamlet leaders, the courts generally called the ostracism a private wrong. Section 709 of the Civil Code made intentional harm a tort: the "intentional or negligent invasion of another person's rights or legally protected interests." The judges called ostracism an intentional tort.

2. Criminal cases. -- One of the earliest criminal cases reached the Supreme Court in 1911 (Case 5). The case involved a man who had failed in business. He had largely brought it upon himself, and had caused his neighbors considerable harm in the process. The community imposed ostracism. Lest his friends decide to ignore the sanction, some members of the community contacted his likely sympathizers. Should the sympathizers ignore the decree, they warned, they would meet the same fate.

The court declared this threat to the sympathizers a crime. No one has a right to social interchange, it reasoned. If anyone finds that a neighbor no longer speaks

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4 See Smith (1961, 523) for a description of the requisitioning, and its ties to murahachibu.


6 For additional case finding it a crime to threaten someone with murahachibu -- absent unusual justifying circumstances -- for violating the ban on having contact with the original offender, see *Kuni v. Nakayama*, 7 Daihan keishu 533 (Sup. Ct. Aug. 3, 1928).
to him, he has not necessarily suffered a legal wrong. But should his neighbors stop contact collectively, they do commit a crime. “When the residents in an area decide collectively to punish a member, and then declare that they will cease all contact with him, they have excluded the member from their society. They have degraded his personhood, and harmed his good name.” They have, in violation of Section 222 of the Criminal Code, committed criminal intimidation.7

Government skepticism toward ostracism did not start in 1911. Even during the Tokugawa shogunate the government was skeptical. In 1822, 26 villagers in Komono village (in current Mie prefecture) sued in the local (domainal) court to expel their neighbor Kishichi. He was not, they complained, “conforming to the customs of the village” (Case 6).8 Kishichi had moved to the hamlet from a nearby village. He farmed land which his family had already owned, but the villages wanted him evicted anyway. The court thought the attempted expulsion an over-reaction, and punished the village leaders (Suzuki 2020).

The Tokugawa government did accept ostracism as a general tool of village control, even though its dangers were recognized. In 1827, one Kyujiro and two other villagers in what is now Saitama prefecture claimed that Chojiro owed them five ryo from loans. Chojiro denied that he owed them money. After a collection mission progressed to self-help in the form of grabbing bales of rice, a fight ensued. The crowd started breaking farm implements, and eventually a dozen other people came with the headman to break up the fight. In the end, Kyujiro paid 3 of the 5 ryo.

Two days later, the village formally ostracized Kyujiro. He immediately sued nineteen of the villagers, including the village headman. Unless they canceled the ostracism, he claimed, he would not be able to pay his taxes. The defendants denied that they had ever ostracized him, and the case settled: the debt was declared paid, the defendants admitted to the ostracism, apologized, and reinstated the plaintiff (Ooms 1996, 216-221)

Although the Supreme Court announced a flat ban on ostracism in the 1911 case (Case 5), courts generally took a more measured approach. In the 1939 road expansion case (Case 3), the Supreme Court did conclude that the ostracism

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7 Kuni v. Mori, 17 Keiroku 1520, 1522 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 1911).

8 See generally Suzuki (2020).
was criminal. But it held it criminal only because the offenders imposed it “without a reason deemed appropriate by social convention.” As “judged by social convention, their ostracism had lacked a recognizably proper reason.” Given that lack of a “proper reason”, it violated “public order and good morals”.

Yet if in 1939 the court declared only unreasonable ostracism illegal (Case 3), the courts usually found the ostracism in the reported cases unreasonable. One would search long to locate any village ostracism that the courts permitted.

3. Tort cases. -- Return to the 1921 Supreme Court case where Kodama refused to provide land for a road (Case 2). The case did not stem from a criminal prosecution. Instead, Kodama had brought it in tort against the hamlet members who engineered the ostracism against him. Through the case, the Court made clear the tort equivalent of Criminal Code Section 222: to ostracize collectively a member of a community is an intentional tort. “Leave aside doctors and innkeepers for whom special rules exist,” the court explained. Its reasoning tracked the principles it would apply in 1939 to criminal prosecutions (Case 3): 

"If someone wants to take part in social interchange, he does not have a right to demand it." But that each person may refuse to interact with another individually does not mean that a group can refuse to do so collectively.

The defendants argued that Kodama had “damaged the collective interest” of their community, and they were merely trying to “preserve its good customs and order.” The court would have none of it: if community members collectively decide to terminate contact with an offending member, they commit a tort under Section 709 of the Civil Code.

And return to the 1952 Tokyo High Court decision about the government's rice requisition program (Case 4). The offending farmer refused to supply the share of the collective rice burden assigned to him by the hamlet, and the community responded with ostracism. The court declared the retaliation a tort:

This local association constitutes the base for all social activity among the residents. To participate as an individual in this activity is a right that cannot be taken

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9 Ogawa v. Kodama, 27 Daishin'in minroku at 1264.

away, or severely limited. ... Absent special considerations, the ostracism constitutes a tort.

4. Extortion. -- The potential criminal sanctions do not end with Section 222. If neighbors vote to ostracize someone in their community, they do indeed commit criminal intimidation under Section 222 of the Criminal Code. But if they demand money in return for canceling that sanction, they commit the more serious crime of extortion under Section 249. In 1923, a man named Kurosawa in a small Akita community made charcoal with material he had stolen from the hamlet and from a local contractor (Case 7). Upon discovering his theft, hamlet leaders called a general meeting and voted to terminate all contact with him.

In time, Kurosawa sought reconciliation. He asked his older brother to act as intermediary. The hamlet called a second meeting. Kurosawa apologized, and most of the members seemed inclined to end the sanction. The defendant (unnamed), however, intervened. Rather than forthrightly forgive Kurosawa, he urged the others to require that Kurosawa first pay a penalty. He demanded 200 to 300 yen. Kurosawa eventually paid 100 yen, still a massive amount for a poor farmer. Announcing the decision in 1927, the court called this extortion under Section 249.11

5. Comic relief. -- Universities. Whether involving sensible norms or not, ostracism claims occasionally take odd turns. A 2017 case involved a breach of contract suit by an M.A. candidate at Tsukuba University (Case 8). The student claimed that his adviser had effectively ostracized him (the term in this case being “hamon”): he had forced him to study a topic he didn't want to study, he had exercised “academic harassment,” he had engaged in “power harassment,” and for all this he owed him a refund on two years' tuition.

The adviser's frustration seeps from the pages of the opinion. The student had originally presented his research plans in a workshop. “Consumerist Self-Change Theory: Bourdieu and Lacan,” he called his project. He liked it, but most everyone else was lost. “The other graduate students aren't following you,” his adviser warned. “Could you try explaining it again without using technical terms?” Maybe the M.A. candidate tried, because soon those other

11 Kuni v. Mukogawa, 6 Daihan keishu 361 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 20, 1927). Canceling the punishment upon negotiation through an intermediary, followed by apology was common, as Smith (1961) notes. Ali & Miller (2016) describe “tempering ostracism with forgiveness” a more efficient form of punishment than permanent ostracism.
graduate students began asking questions like: “What are you trying to do in this project? Why does this matter for research in [our field]?” Unfortunately, the court continued, “the plaintiff could not respond.”

After the workshop, the student wrote his adviser. He wanted to drop the project and pursue one of two completely different topics instead. “To be honest,” the professor replied, “I have no idea what you want to do. You're studying this and that, but are you reading the books? You can't just say, if this doesn't work I'll try that instead, or if that doesn't work I'll try this instead. Stop looking at just the surface. Ask yourself what you really wanted to do when you decided to study.”

Professors everywhere will be relieved to know that the court dismissed the claim.12

Syndicates. Organized crime syndicates in Japan (the yakuza) routinely ostracize insubordinate members. Lest rival syndicates attribute to them any misconduct by a deviant member, they send a notice (typically a printed post-card) announcing his ostracism to their local rivals. One 2011 case, for example, involved fratricidal battles within the massive Yamaguchi gumi crime syndicate (Case 9). The leader of one faction shot the boss of the Yamaguchi gumi in a hotel lounge; the syndicate expelled (hamon) the faction; war ensued.13

A curious 2018 variation on this practice occurred in Shizuoka City (Case 10). The unnamed plaintiff was a long-time member of the local mob. Now in his 60s with liver cancer, he was no longer of much use to the organization. Anticipating heavy medical expenses, he applied for public welfare. The welfare office turned him down. He was still in the syndicate, and the office did not pay welfare benefits to members of the mob.

The aging gangster called a police officer he knew. He explained that he needed cancer surgery and planned to leave the mob. How, he asked, could he prove to the welfare office that he was no longer a member in good standing? The officer suggested he produce the usual expulsion postcard (hamonjo). Unfortunately, the gangster replied, although his boss would sign a certificate saying he had left the organization, he was too scrupulous to circulate an ostracism notice: “You haven't done anything wrong. How can I circulate an expulsion notice?” The plaintiff


13 Kuni v. [No name given], 2011 WLJPCA 05249002 (Osaka D. Ct. May 24, 2011).
pleaded with the welfare office to approve him anyway. The office refused; he sued, and the district judge told the welfare office to proceed with the application.14

B. Troubling cases:
   1. Introduction. -- In most of the reported ostracism cases, the community did not ostracize a member in order to enforce welfare-enhancing norms; instead, it ostracized a member to enforce seriously anti-social norms. There are exceptions, to be sure. In one case, it punished a man who imposed costs on his neighbors by repeatedly making bad bets in business (Case 5); in two others, it punished a man who refused to contribute toward infrastructure improvements (Cases 2 and 3); in still another, it punished a man who reneged on his share of the community tax burden (Case 4).
      
      Yet these plausibly benign cases are not the rule: most of the published opinions involve far more troubling disputes. Some of the cases seem to involve reasonable disagreements about community policy (Section 2, below). Some involve hamlets dominated by criminals (Sec. 3). Some involve hamlets that punished members for reporting criminal activities to the government (Sec. 4). Some involve hamlets that took property from other members (Secs. 5 and 6). And many involve hamlets that were engaging in electoral fraud (Sec. 7).
      
      2. Policy disagreements. -- In some cases, the community seems to punish a member simply for disagreeing about village policy. In one 1935 Supreme Court case, for instance, a firm had planned to build a synthetic textile factory near the mouth of the Yagyu river in Toyohashi city (Case 11). Most residents opposed the factory on the grounds that the effluents would slash the amount and quality of the fish, shellfish, and seaweed harvested. When three villagers announced their support for the factory, the rest of the community retaliated by ostracizing the three. Absent more detail, one cannot tell what was at stake. Perhaps the three dissenters had invested in the factory. Perhaps, the factory had bribed them. The court does not say. Instead, it treats the dispute as an honest disagreement about village policy, and held the ostracism to be criminal intimidation.15

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14 [No names given], 2018 WLJPCA 04266020 (Shizuoka D. Ct. Apr. 26, 2018).

A second 1935 Supreme Court case involved a small island off the southern coast of Kyushu (Case 12). Part of the Amami oshima chain, it lay a 17- to 18-hour ferry ride from the city of Kagoshima. In 1935 the island became the site of what historians would call the great “Lily Bulb War.” The residents primarily grew lily bulbs for export. In 1932, a Yokohama nursery owner formed the Japan Lily Export Association and obtained exclusive control over the government-required export inspections. Now able to block rival exporters, he planned to dominate the market. Roughly contemporaneously, however, Mitsubishi Trading decided to challenge his control. Mitsubishi offered the farmers an exclusive trading contract. The local farming association held a meeting. The farmers debated the two options. About 2,000 members voted in favor of the Mitsubishi contract and 138 voted against. The majority argued that the 138 opponents were jeopardizing the deal with Mitsubishi for private gain and hit the 138 with ostracism. The court held the ostracism to be criminal intimidation.16

3. The village bully. -- A 2007 Niigata District Court case involved a village bully (Case 13). Taro Kono (a pseudonym) dominated his village through wild and unpredictable violence. He picked fights. He beat people. His neighbors had called the police on him multiple times: when he started to strangle someone; when he swung a metal bar at someone; when he attacked a man with a sake bottle. Kono also ran the annual village festival. According to the other residents, he ran it autocratically and stole community funds. Several members tried to distance themselves from the event. When they did, Kono retaliated by intimidating the other village members into ostracizing them. The Niigata District Court declared the ostracism a tort.17

4. The snitch. -- Six decades ago, anthropologist Robert Smith (1961, 527) observed that Japanese who reported community misdeeds to the police could suffer ostracism. So they did. So they continue to do. Akimitsu Fujii ran a general store in Kumamoto with his wife and three daughters (Case 14). One January afternoon, he watched the local firemen train. After practice, the

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firemen shared drinks. Several of them started a fight with a firefighter who had missed practice. When the police interviewed Fujii several days later, he detailed what he had seen. The firefighters retaliated by organizing a boycott of Fujii’s store, and drove him and his family out of town. He sued, and the court held the firefighters liable to Fujii.\(^{18}\)

Another ostracism victim worried that the local residents' association was cheating the community (Case 15). The association was constructing a new building, and he suspected that the contractor was shaving costs. He began to circulate a complaint. Steadily, he seemed to ramp up the tension. The association leaders were (in the court's words) “crazy in the head,” he asserted. They were evil. They were “liars,” they were perpetrating a fraud. The community sued him for slander, and won. They also expelled him from the association. When the victim sued in response, the Tokyo District Court (2008) reasoned that expulsion from the neighborhood association would have a major impact on his life, and vacated the sanction (slander or no slander).\(^{19}\)

In 1954, the Fukuoka High Court faced a case of ostracism by an 18-household hamlet against four members (Case 16). The opinion does not describe the full scope of the offending conduct (opinions rarely do), but the precipitating event seems to have been something one of the victims told the village government. The national government was still requisitioning rice from farming villages. Apparently, one of the four victims told the government how much rice it could safely demand of the hamlet. The other members were outraged, and expelled all four. The court convicted the hamlet leaders of criminal intimidation.\(^{20}\)

5. **Theft.** -- Tomoyuki Arakawa was a nationally prominent potter in the town of Yagusa (within Toyota city, Aichi prefecture) (Case 17).\(^{21}\) His family had lived in the

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\(^{19}\) [No names given], 2030 Hanrei jiho 38 (Tokyo D. Ct. Oct. 17, 2008).

\(^{20}\) Kuni v. [No name given], 7 Kosai keishu 217 (Fukuoka High Ct. Mar. 31, 1954).

\(^{21}\) Shun'ei Aikawa, "yakkaisha" no letteru wo hararete chien no rin no soto he tsukyu [Labeled a "Trouble Maker" and Thrown out of the Region, Diamond Online, June 26, 2012; see also Jichiku no tochi ga ookane unde ... [Communal Land Generates Massive Cash and ...], Shukan Asahi, Jan. 30, 2009; Toyota ga jimoto de daikibo "kankyo hakai" [Massive "Environmental Destruction" in Toyota Area], Sentaku, Feb. 1, 2012. A recent case of murahachibu in the city of Usa, Oita prefecture, similarly involved the distribution of subsidies to local residents.
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Village since the Tokugawa period. Other than seven years in nearby Nagoya city, he himself had spent his entire life in Yagusa.

Arakawa made pots with clay he dug from the communal mountain. He built his kiln on the mountain. He fired his pots with wood he collected on the mountain. Sometimes he left his home for days on end to work at the kiln. His neighbors considered him an odd fellow, but no one much minded how he made his pots.

The mountain covered roughly 40 percent of the “town.” Gardens and paddies occupied most of the rest. The national government had conveyed the mountain to the village in 1913. Title had lain with the descendants of the 75 families who were resident in 1913 ever since, including the Arakawa family.

Over time, the humble mountain became extraordinarily valuable. A mining company discovered it contained valuable deposits of silica. Near as it was to the Nagoya metropolis, it had development potential. Near as it was to the Toyota factory network, it could provide land for access roads. By 2008, the constituent 1913 families had exploited its potential so shrewdly that they had amassed 2 billion yen (about $20 million).

The group decided to distribute the 2 billion yen to the constituent owners, but refused to pay Arakawa his share. Arakawa sued for the money, but he also sued to stop the development. At root, he seems to have cared less about the money than about stopping the mining, the construction, and the roads. The other villagers invented one reason after another not to pay him his share, but they mostly wanted him gone. Ostracism came naturally in this case. “Just leave Yagusa,” one village official begged. As of 2020, the litigation was apparently still in progress.

6. Forced redistribution. – Conveniently structured to facilitate taking from the wealthy few and transferring to the poorer many, ostracism is an intrinsically populist mechanism. Communities use it for exactly that purpose. In 1946, the Miyamoto family on the island of Shikoku decided to cancel its leases with several families who had been renting its land (Case 18). Both the Miyamoto family and the lessees had been part of the local Japan Farmers Union (Nihon nomin kumiai), a hard-left group with alliances (conflicting ones) to both the Socialist and Communist

Parties. Sixty of the eighty households there were part of this Union. Once the Miyamoto family announced their plan to cancel the tenancies, the local Union expelled and ostracized them. The Miyamotos could find no one from the hamlet willing to work on their land. The local court declared the ostracism a tort, and the parties settled out of court.22

The year 1946 was also the year of the U.S.-imposed “land reform” program (see Ramseyer 2015). The Miyamotos may have cancelled the leases in the hope that they would obtain better terms for land they tilled themselves. Under the program as eventually imposed, the government took land from farmers owning more than 3 hectare (with nominal compensation) and gave it to their former renters (at a nominal price). Subject to modest variation, the redistribution applied to all farm land.

The program famously did not apply to mountain land. Although worth less than farm land, the mountains had real value. Obviously, they provided lumber. They supplied the firewood and grasses that farm households needed. Near metropolitan centers, many had development potential (as the Yagusa families discovered, Case 17). And many mountains also contained food -- the “mountain vegetables” (sansai) used in some dishes, and the extraordinarily expensive (sometimes $1000 per kg) mushrooms known as matsutake.

One Hyogo town managed its local mountain collectively through a voluntary association (Case 19). The group included 103 households, a majority of the local residents. In 1950, the association decided to require all villagers owning more than 2 hectare of the mountain land to transfer to the association without compensation all rights to the sansai and matsutake on their land. The national government had not redistributed the mountain land, so the locals decided to do it on their own.

Five families refused to cooperate with the expropriation. When the association withheld from them their share of the communal profits in response, they sued. In retaliation for their lawsuit, the association declared ostracism on the five and on all members of their families. In the criminal case that followed, the district court acquitted the association members on the ground that the

sanctions did not bind, but the high court reversed. In 1958, the Supreme Court affirmed.23

7. Electoral fraud. -- The most common of the troubling cases involve elections. The Japanese Diet did not adopt universal manhood suffrage in national elections until 1925, but suffrage for some local elections reached more broadly before that. In the typical case, members of a community assembled and collectively decided whom they would support. They realized that individually they would have no impact on the electoral outcome, but that by voting together they might in some elections be able to flip the outcome.

In 1913, the Supreme Court used an electoral dispute to decide perhaps the oddest of all its ostracism cases (Case 20). The villagers in a hamlet had agreed to vote for a given candidate, and had further agreed to punish anyone who defected from that agreement. Two residents reneged. The others imposed ostracism and the prosecutors initiated criminal cases against several of the ostracizing villagers. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions. Ostracism was not always criminal, it explained. Villagers can ostracize members for a wide variety of reasons, some of them morally justified but some not. In this case, the two offenders had reneged on their promise to vote for the community-chosen candidate. When a community punishes someone to force him to do something he has no obligation otherwise to do, its members commit criminal intimidation. So too when they punish someone to stop him from doing something he has every right to do. Here, however, they simply punished the two members for breach of contract. They had agreed to vote a certain way, and they had done otherwise. The court ignored the obvious electoral context, and reversed the convictions.24

In 1920, the Supreme Court took a more typical approach to these electorally tied ostracism disputes (Case 21). For the national Diet election in May of 1920, most of the voters in a town in Mie Prefecture favored one candidate. Katsunosuke Oku favored another. Outraged by his independence, the other villagers decided to sever all ties with Oku and his family. The prosecutor brought charges, the judge convicted, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court followed what would become a standard formula: no one


24 Kuni v. Okubo, 19 Keiroku 1349 (Sup. Ct. Nov. 29, 1913).
has a right to social intercourse; no one breaks the law by refusing it; but when members of a community refuse that intercourse collectively, they commit criminal intimidation.25

A Supreme Court case from 1924 followed the same pattern (Case 22). In September of 1923, four people had found themselves arrested for violating electoral law in the Miyagi prefectural elections. A certain Mr. Honda, living in the same hamlet that they did, had turned them in. The arrested villagers complained to their neighbors, and the hamlet's mutual aid society voted to expel Honda and his father and to ostracize them. The trial court convicted the villagers of criminal intimidation, and the Supreme Court (1924) affirmed.26

A second 1924 Supreme Court case involved not an actual hamlet sanction, but a threat by an influential leader in Nara unilaterally to oust an uncooperative villager (Case 23). The leader had told the villager to vote for a particular candidate. Try anything else, he warned, and he would expel him from the village. The prosecutor brought criminal charges against the leader. Expelling someone from a village is not a technical term, of course, and the defendant's lawyer professed not to know what it meant. The Supreme Court declared it easy to see that the defendant meant “murahachibu.” The lawyer also protested that the defendant had had no authority to expel someone anyway. The Supreme Court observed that the defendant was an influential man, and that a resident could reasonably worry about the threat. It affirmed the conviction.27

IV. Zones of Judicial Neutrality

A. Introduction:

These cases suggest that the courts generally decide whether to intervene in ostracism disputes on the basis of the conduct involved: they intervene when they believe a community ostracized for improper reasons. In a small number of disputes, however, the courts purport not to intervene at all. In cases involving political parties and religious groups, for example, the courts instead announce that they will let the losses lie where they fall.


26 Kuni v. [No names given], Daihan keishu 506 (Sup. Ct. June 20, 1924).

27 Kuni v. [No names given], 3 Daihan keishu 338 (Sup. Ct. Apr. 15, 1924). The prewar Supreme Court also affirmed criminal convictions in murahachibu disputes over an election in Kuni v. Kamiya, 13 Daihan keishu 5406 (Sup. Ct. Mar. 5, 1934), and Kuni v. [No names given], Hanrei hyoron kei 123 (Sup. Ct. Sept. 9, 1942).
In fact, this summary potentially misleads. First, these cases do not involve the typical community ostracism at stake in the earlier cases. Instead, they involve the arguably distinct question of who controls the membership rosters of voluntary associations. They do not involve a village that decides to shun a non-conformist resident; they involve associations that people joined precisely to express their political and religious preferences.

The disputes arise when the leaders of an association decide to expel someone over questions involving those political or religious beliefs. Japanese courts -- taking a stand here much like that of the American courts -- try not to intervene. As Douglas Linder (1984, 1881) put it in the U.S. context, courts hesitate to compel the “benefits of membership in a voluntary association.” Instead, they tend to declare that “the associational freedom at stake, the right of an association to define its own membership, is fundamental to a conception of a pluralistic free society.”

Second, although the courts claim not to intervene in these disputes, effectively they do intervene -- indeed, they have no choice but to intervene. In both cases below, for example, an association decided to evict a dissident member from association housing. Although in each case the court declared that it would not intervene, nonintervention meant that it would not stop the association from evicting the dissident.

B. Political Parties:

The best known of the political cases involved a struggle for power at the center of the Japan Communist Party (JCP) ([Case 24]). Kenji Miyamoto, Satomi Hakamoto, and Sanzo Nozaka had helped lead the party during the stormy pre-war years. Miyamoto had studied economics at the Tokyo Imperial University; Hakamada had studied in the Soviet Union. Together, in 1933 they tortured to death Tatsuo Obata, a colleague they suspected of spying for the police. Sanzo Nozaka had found himself in Moscow during Stalin's purges, and had survived by inventing charges against another JCP member in Moscow -- a man whom Stalin promptly had shot. After the war, the American-run occupation welcomed all three into the public realm.

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28 Definitions are of course arbitrary. Note that the most common modern example of ostracism among western observers involve the *meidung* (shunning) among the Amish -- expulsion from a church, exactly as discussed in this section.

29 On the occupation's role in all this (and the place of E.H. Norman), see Miwa & Ramseyer (GO WWP).
The three men promptly took over the JCP. Nozaka won election to the national legislature in April 1946. When Stalin ordered the Party in 1950 to abandon peaceful tactics, Miyamoto went underground and masterminded the party's bombing and sabotage campaign, while Hakamada stayed with the party's legal faction. Miyamoto returned to electoral politics after Stalin's death, and eventually (in 1970) rose to the post of central committee chairman; Hakamada simultaneously served as vice chairman. Decades later, Miyamoto continued to insist that Obata had died a natural death; Hakamada wrote that they had strangled him to death. Hakamada also nursed a long-term suspicion that Nozaka remained a Soviet spy -- an accusation that the party leadership declared treasonous (but which Soviet archives would later prove to have been true).

Late in the 1970s, Hakamada began to write about the way he and Miyamoto had murdered Obata. Once he started writing, Miyamoto immediately moved to eliminate him from the party. In 1977, Miyamoto successfully dropped Hakamada from the party Central Committee. When Hakamada retaliated by publishing yet more information about the murder, Miyamoto led the party to expel him.

Since 1963, Hakamada had been living in party housing. For a house with market rental pegged by the court at 132,000 yen per month, Hakamada paid just 22,000. Having now expelled him, the party administration ordered him to leave. Hakamada refused, and the party sued. Hakamada explained that he was growing old, and -- having worked for the party at low pay his entire life -- had very little savings.

The District Court ordered Hakamada out, and the High and Supreme Courts affirmed. The courts declared internal party disputes beyond their jurisdiction. Said the High Court:

> Political parties are indispensable for supporting representative democracy, and effective bodies for helping citizens structure their political thoughts.

Never mind that Miyamoto had fought for decades to end representative democracy. The court continued:

> The expulsion and other punishment of party members are matters internal to the parties themselves. These matters follow from the right of party self-governance, and the courts should treat them with ample respect.
The courts would not intervene in party affairs. One might have thought this meant the state would not help the party evict Hakamada from party housing. Whatever their logic (they did not explain), the justices decided it meant the opposite.\textsuperscript{30}

C. Religious Organizations:

Courts show the same reticence toward disputes within religious organizations.\textsuperscript{31} In the United States., writes Eric Posner (1996, 185), the “Free Exercise Clause and common law principles of free association ... prevent people from suing a religious group for expelling them ....” For the most part, so too in Japan.

During the last decades of the 20th century, Japanese courts faced several cases involving the highest profile religious revitalization movement in modern Japan: the “Soka gakkai.” The “Nichiren shoshu” Buddhist denomination had traced its roots to its namesake 13th century priest, Nichiren.\textsuperscript{32} In 1930, Nichiren shoshu adherents organized the Soka gakkai as their lay organization. Once the Second World War ended, the gakkai grew explosively. It remains enormously popular and has steadfastly maintained its roots in the blue-collar working class community. In 1960, gakkai leadership passed to Daisaku Ikeda. Ikeda proved to be a polarizing figure, and simultaneously brought both international publicity and domestic hostility.

In time, clerical leaders within the Nichiren shoshu denomination grew suspicious of Ikeda. By 1991, tension reached the point where the denominational leaders demanded that their priests attack the gakkai leadership and pledge loyalty to the denomination. Soon, they would expel the gakkai itself. One of the Nichiren shoshu priests refused to attack the gakkai (Case 25). He lived with his wife in temple housing, but despite enormous pressure refused to sign the proffered statement. In response, the denomination expelled him from the priesthood, slashed his pay, and forced him and his wife out of temple housing.

The priest sued for tort damages, but the Shizuoka District Court refused. To the court, religious denominations were like political parties. The constitution protected their self-governance, and (unless


\textsuperscript{31} As courts tend to do in the U.S. too. See E. Posner (1996, 55-60).

\textsuperscript{32} “Nichiren shoshu” is distinct from the larger “Nichiren” denomination.
they violated “public order and good morals” or threatened “basic human rights”) the courts would not intervene. Here, that meant that they would not order the denomination to compensate a dissenting priest whose career it had ruined.\footnote{[No names given], 1650 Hanrei jiho 109 (Shizuoka D. Ct. Aug. 8, 1997); see also Hakuren’in v. Furuya, 1103 Hanrei jiho 2 (Sup. Ct. July 20, 1993).}

V. Findings
A. The Basic Observation:
   A dispute arises within a village. One faction wins. Members of the winning group decide to ostracize the losers. The losers sue. And the court adjudicates.

   Most of these court disputes over ostracism in Japan share one basic characteristic: they have nothing at all to do with the theory at stake in Section I about informal social sanctions against deviance. Many of the cases do not involve attempts by a community to control anti-social deviance at all. Instead, they involve opportunistic tactics by the community itself. In some cases, the community tried to punish a member who tried to stop the broader patterns of community misconduct (Cases 1, 14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23). In some cases, the community used the ostracism to extort property from a minority of its members (Cases 4, 17, 18, 19). In some cases, an opportunist manipulated the mechanism of ostracism to his private advantage (Case 13). And in some cases the community split, and one faction used ostracism to penalize the other (Cases 11, 12, 24, 25).

   Turn to three further questions about these cases: (a) How did the courts adjudicate the disputes presented to them? (b) Which disputes did the villagers take to ostracism, and which cases of ostracism did they litigate in court?, and (c) What did the plaintiffs or prosecutors hope to win by filing the cases that they did.

B. How Did the Courts Adjudicate These Disputes?
   1. The informational mismatch. -- In evaluating the informal sanctions that a village imposes, the courts look at a fundamentally different set of information than did the village. When villagers decide to ostracize a deviant, they typically do so on the basis of a long history. In many cases, they may have thought the deviant's latest behavior the last straw -- the most recent misconduct in a long life of misconduct. Should they decide to ostracize the deviant, they will not punish him just for his latest
outrage. They will punish him for the totality of his life history and character.

Judges do not do this. A judge does not know the deviant. About the deviant, he hears only what the lawyers and witnesses decide to tell him. The judge does not necessarily have a less accurate information set than the village. He does have a decidedly more circumscribed information set.

2. The risks to stopping ostracism. -- Communities can ostracize to enforce welfare-maximizing norms, but they can also ostracize in ways that lower social welfare. When parties to an ostracism file suit, a judge faces the task of distinguishing between those two possibilities. To do so, the judge will ask whether the community used ostracism to enforce a socially desirable norm. He or she will ask whether community members accurately understood the underlying facts. And he or she will ask whether, even if they did accurately understand the facts, they might be caught in an inefficient equilibrium.

Generally, a judge who forces unwilling people to interact with each other will lower aggregate social welfare. After all, the parties chose not to interact. If they had thought the interaction advantageous, they would not have made that choice. First, sometimes, the members of a large group have poorer information. Courts have a fundamentally different information set than the village. In a small and coherent village, that mismatch will tend to favor the village: In a larger community, however, the informational contrast may favor the court. In a bilateral transaction, A captures all the returns to any investment he makes in acquiring information about B. As the number of parties increases, A captures an increasingly smaller share of those returns. Facing growing incentives to free-ride on each other's efforts, the parties may fail to invest at the socially optimal level in information about each other.34

34 Consider gossip. First, although people can rely on gossip in deciding whether to ostracize, yet gossip can result from informational cascades. See S. Bikhchandani, D. Hirshleifer & I. Welch (1992). In that case, people would be happy to end it—if they knew the truth.

Second, gossip is reviled not because it punishes bad behavior, but because it so often gets it wrong and accuses the innocent. Given a collective action problem, no one other than the target has much incentive to incur the cost of figuring out what actually happened. If the target himself protests his innocence, moreover, the others will rationally discount his statements by his obvious self-interest.

Third, if we may inject a topical reference: this is one reason why in cases of alleged police brutality or FBI malfeasance, prosecutors should sometimes bring cases even if they think they cannot win conviction: the accused need vindication, and only a neutral court can provide that. It may look like the prosecutors are persecuting the
Second, ostracism can result from coordination failure. The parties may realize that the ostracism hurts them all, yet find themselves in situation in which it is individually irrational for any one of them to deviate. They could all benefit if they all stopped the ostracism, but no one will volunteer to be the first. Nobody wants to risk being the only dissident in 1980’s Rumania, but (almost) everyone would be happy to help hang Ceaușescu if only he knew that his neighbors would join him.

Third, ostracism can represent simple extortion. As in Cases 18 and 19, the few wealthy farmers in a village cannot farm without the cooperation of the poorer many. In such a context, the poorer many can threaten ostracism on the wealthy few, and agree to desist for money or property.

3. The U.S. contrast. -- In cases of ostracism in Japan, the government may intervene. Victims may sue the ostracizers, and the courts may award them relief. Prosecutors may file charges against the ostracizers, and the judges may convict.

In the U.S., by contrast, the courts hesitate. They do recognize the tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress. Yet usually they intervene in ostracism cases only when they see a group threatening someone in a “protected” category. Under labor law, for example, they might intervene if they believe a company is using ostracism to isolate a union organizer. Under Title VII, they may intervene if they attribute the ostracism to sex, race, religion, or national origin. But absent a protected category, courts usually leave socially isolated victims to their own devices (e.g., Coleman 2006, 60).

4. France and Germany. -- In routinely striking down ostracism, Japan is not the outlier among wealthy democracies. America is. James Q. Whitman, for example, finds the German and French courts much more ready than U.S. courts to protect people who find themselves socially harassed. Together with Gabrielle Friedman he writes (2003, 243):

It is becoming common coin, in continental law, that employers must be forbidden to harass ... all of their employees. Nor are employers the only target. Continental law is also concerned with the way employees treat each defendants; in actuality, they may be doing them a favor, when their reputations are already destroyed in the court of public opinion and need restoration.
other: It is also becoming common coin that employees must be forbidden to harass their co-workers as well.

According to Whitman, American courts worry about the government intruding into their private sphere; European courts “aim[] to protect people from shame and humiliation, from loss of public dignity” (Whitman 2004, 1164; see Whitman 2000).

Whitman plausibly attributes the continental phenomenon in part to its aristocratic past. Germany and France both maintained an “honor culture” among their elites, he writes. When they democratized, they extended the honor and dignity formerly limited to those elites to everyone.

Although Whitman may capture what German and French elites saw in the legal choices they made, aristocratic “honor culture” does not explain the cross-national contrasts. Japan, too, has an aristocratic past. And Japanese courts did not wait to police ostracism until after they democratized in the late 1940s. They already held ostracism illegal during the distinctly non-democratic decades of the early 20th century.

C. Selection into Litigation and Ostracism:

1. Introduction. -- We do not have a random sample of village disputes, of disputes that led to ostracism, or even of ostracism cases that led to litigation. Consider first data bearing on the actual incidence of ostracism. Then turn to the biases that result when the disputing parties choose to litigate a case of ostracism, and when they choose to transform a dispute into a case of ostracism.

2. Estimating the incidence of ostracism. Measuring the incidence of ostracism is hard. If ostracism has different consequences from place to place, one would not expect people to use it similarly everywhere. Neither would one expect courts to respond to it similarly.

Ostracism does indeed have different consequences from place to place. It hurts residents in an isolated village more than in an anonymous city. It hurts workers in a tightly structured, regulated profession (like physicians) more than it hurts workers with broadly useful skills such as manual labor. It hurts merchants who trade on credit within broad networks with high levels of social capital more than it hurts merchants who trade in cash on the spot market.
And even within a given industry, ostracism can have different consequences from place to place. In the 19th century, Japan and U.S. were both overwhelmingly agricultural societies. Yet among these farmers, ostracism would have hit Japanese villagers much harder than American villagers. Japanese farmers grew rice, and pre-mechanized wet-rice farming was a harshly communal affair (Wittfogel 1957; Haley 2016). Without community help, a farmer had no choice but to abandon the industry and move to town. Kansas farmers grew wheat. They could easily make do (and often did make do) without community help.

Unfortunately, we cannot pretend to know how frequently communities use formal ostracism -- though it does seem relatively infrequent in Japan. We know of no studies of its incidence in the U.S. We have a bit more information about Japan, but it does not support any claim that ostracism is widespread. The Asahi and Mainichi newspapers (two of the leading national newspapers) include almost no cases of ostracism beyond those discussed in this article (electronic searches, 2020).

Government records include evidence of about 20 instances of ostracism per year (see Table 1). Even if he chooses not to file suit, a Japanese who believes that others have infringed his human rights may report the offense to the local office of the Ministry of Justice. Officials from the Ministry will then investigate. If they believe his rights have been infringed, they may try to help him obtain relief. They explain; they negotiate; they mediate; they introduce private or public organizations that might help.

[Insert Table 1 about here.]

In 2018, people reported 19,600 cases of human rights violation to the Ministry (Homu sho 2018). Few of these concerned ostracism. In Table 1 Panel B, we give the number specifically of ostracism cases that people reported to the Ministry of Justice human rights offices over the past five years. Obviously, we have no reason to think that people reported all cases. Subject to that qualification, from 2015 to 2019 they did report about 20 cases each year. The Ministry does not report details beyond location. Disproportionately, these cases do come from northeastern Japan (the Tohoku region), central Japan (the Chubu region), and the areas adjoining the Seto Inland Sea (the Chugoku and Shikoku regions).
3. Selection into Litigation. -- Although we describe cases that parties litigated to trial, people who fight with their neighbors litigate only a small minority of their disputes. Moreover, they litigate a decidedly non-random sample of them. In turn, prosecutors pursue to trial only a small minority of the people arrested by police. As in civil suits, they pursue a decidedly non-random sample of the people who are notified of misbehavior (threatened with lawsuit or arrested).

The logic to the selection follows the well-known dynamic of litigation and settlement (e.g., Landes & R. Posner 1975; Priest & B. Klein 1984). Because litigation costs more than informal settlement, both sides to a dispute will usually prefer to settle out of court in the shadow of what they expect the court to decide.

Note that the informational logic to the dispute (Sec. D, below) does not affect this dynamic. Suppose a plaintiff sues to obtain public certification of his version of the dispute. Suppose that the plaintiff and the village leaders both agree that a court will ultimately decide in the plaintiff's favor. Rationally, both gain by negotiating an out-of-court settlement in which the village leaders publicly acknowledge the plaintiff's version of the dispute.

Note too that plaintiffs and prosecutors will tend to select cases in which the ostracism appears improper. To the extent that plaintiffs sue to have the court publicly endorse their claims of innocence, they will not sue when the court will shame them instead. Prosecutors, too, will select the cases to pursue for the message the suit might convey to the rest of the community. In no country do prosecutors have the resources to pursue all (or even most) of the cases that police forward to them. Instead, they focus on the cases that most forcefully reinforce the norms they want people to follow. Among the disputes over ostracism, they will focus on the outrageous decisions. When the village gets ostracism right, the prosecutor will leave it alone.

4. Selection into ostracism. -- The logic of litigation and settlement also applies to costly disputing tactics more generally—such as ostracism. Ostracism is a cessation of voluntary interaction, a return towards autarky. It may apply to money trades, a boycott, or to trades in favors, esteem, or company. Given that parties trade only when mutually advantageous, an end to trade
necessarily hurts them both, destroying the gains from trade.

Given these mutual costs, a dissenter and his community both gain by avoiding ostracism and settling their dispute peacefully. Provided they both anticipate the same outcome if they push the conflict into ostracism, they both benefit by avoiding that confrontation. They gain instead by settling their dispute according to the expected outcome upon confrontation.

Crucially, however, a dissenter and his community can reach this mutually beneficial negotiated settlement only if they can agree about what will happen if they push the dispute into ostracism. When a community is in stasis, with families, economy, roles, and power relations the same as they were the previous hundred years, the parties will often agree about the probable outcome of conflict. They both know how much trade, broadly defined, they would lose from ostracism. They know each other's feasible alternatives. They know whether any villager would defect from the collectively imposed sanction. Sharing similar estimates of the outcome from confrontation (i.e., ostracism), they both gain by avoiding that confrontation.

When a community is in transition of any kind, the parties are less likely to agree on what might happen if they fight. A dissenter may believe he can find profitable employment in a nearby city; the rest of the community may know better. The community may believe they can cheaply replace the dissenter's services; the dissenter may know how much they will miss his talents. With change comes uncertainty.

Crucially, most of the disputes above involve communities in flux. Most obviously, many involve agricultural villages located near rapidly expanding municipal centers. Necessarily, in these cases both sides to a dispute will need to estimate the alternatives available to each other in the greater municipal area. Necessarily, they will rely on information that is much less certain than would be the case in remote and stable agricultural villages from which there is no realistic alternative of escape to the big city and a new life.

D. The Informational Logic to Litigation:

1. The logic. -- Although the plaintiffs in the ostracism cases filed monetary claims, they probably did not collect substantial compensation. Given that these are mostly appellate decisions, few give the amounts the
plaintiffs recovered. Those that do give the numbers do not report large amounts.

The prosecutors could not have expected to obtain heavy penalties either. Again, given that these are appellate decisions, most do not report the penalties imposed. Those that do give them, however, report only suspended sentences.

Instead, the plaintiffs (and prosecutors) seem to have filed the suits for the informational role that courts can play -- they sued to obtain public certification and dissemination of their story. They sued in a way that reflected the role that the courts themselves can play in producing, certifying, and publishing information. They sued to capitalize on what Sadie Blanchard (2018) called the court's role as an "information intermediary." In the course of litigation, courts produce information. When they ultimately decide a case, they certify that information. They announce it to the public. They disseminate it.

Crucially, litigation can change the character of the public understanding of the dispute. If a dissenter sues and wins, the dispute now becomes the judge's word against that of the village leaders. And if the dispute has any news value, the local press will convey the judge's word broadly. Through litigation, the victim both increases the credibility of his account, and conveys that information more broadly than otherwise he could do.

This certification and dissemination matter because of the impact that information about the dispute can have on the relative reputations of the leaders and the dissenters. Those reputations, of course, determine the capacity of both groups for advantageous trade. The more public the information, the greater the impact on future economic transactions.

Courts, explains Blanchard (2018, 512), raise a "[r]eputation's effectiveness" because they spread "information about past behavior ... more widely among potential counterparties." One of us has written about the "stigmatization" function of punishment (Rasmusen, 1996). What the courts illustrate in this context is their capacity to "destigmatize" when communities punish the wrong party.

VI. Conclusions

We in the scholarly community have long treated informal social sanctions as a community's primary way of controlling deviance. We have treated formal legal
sanctions -- both civil and criminal -- as a more costly secondary mechanism. Communities use legal sanctions, in other words, to control those deviant members least vulnerable to informal sanctions. Among the informal sanctions that a community can impose, we have treated ostracism as one of the most severe. Yet very few scholars have studied actual instances of ostracism outside of the psychology laboratory.

We examine legal cases brought over ostracism in modern Japan. Some of these cases are civil, and others criminal. As with any other kind of dispute, very few cases of ostracism actually reach the courts. Of those cases that do reach the courts, however, very few involve a community that used ostracism to restrain deviance. Instead, most cases involve disputes where the community used ostracism opportunistically -- to extract property from a member, for example, to hide community-wide malfeasance, or to harass a rival faction.

The plaintiffs who bring these ostracism cases do not primarily bring them for damages (or prosecutors, for criminal sanctions). Instead, they apparently brought them for informational purposes: to have the court publicly certify their version of the events involved. They brought them because these were the cases where ostracism was unjust, even by village standards. The plaintiffs brought them to obtain the court's imprimatur on their claims of innocence.
### Table 1: Reports of Ostracism to Human Rights Offices, by Year and Region

<table>
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<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Hokk'ido</th>
<th>Tohoku</th>
<th>Kanto</th>
<th>Chubu</th>
<th>Kansai</th>
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2012 Popn 122.6 5.5 9.2 42.7 21.6 22.7 7.5 3.9 (millions)

**Notes:** Cases of “murahachibu” reported to Ministry of Justice Human Rights offices.

**Sources:** Homu sho, Jinken shinpan jiken tokei [Statistics on the Violation of Human Rights] (various years).
Bibliography


