``G751: Game Theory'' Fall 2012 (August 17, 2012)
Your grade will be based on Test 1 (40%) and Test 2 (60%).
Test 1 is on September 11, and
Test 2 is on October 11.
- Instructor: Professor Eric Rasmusen. Email: [email protected]
Office phone: 855-9219; after hours: 855-3356. Office: BU 438. Course Number 29953.
- Web (this page): http://www.rasmusen.org/g751/0.g751.htm. Web (Oncourse): http://oncourse.iu.edu/. The main course website is at
http://rasmusen.org. Grades will be posted on Oncourse, but I will not look at Oncourse regularly.
- Class time: Tuesday and Thursday 1:00-2:15 p.m. in CG 2069.
- Office hours: Wednesdays 10:30-11:30, 1:30-2:30. (but feel free to drop in other times
if my door is open).
- Text: Games and Information, 4th edition (green cover), Eric Rasmusen.
Readings in Games and Information, Blackwell Publishers, 2001.
I've posted questions from old tests at Questions 1 and Questions 2. You can also find answers to the two tests from this
semester in that directory.
The pdf slides I used for this class from a previous year are in the directory
http://www.rasmusen.org/g751/slides-g751 but I expect I'll use the board instead
A. Game Structure and Equilibrium: definitions, dominated and dominant strategies, iterated
dominance, Nash equilibrium, focal points. (Chapter 1).
B. Information: strategic and extensive forms, information sets, imperfect information, incomplete
information, Bayesian games, application to litigation. (Chapter 2)
C. Mixed and Continuous Strategies: mixed strategies, games of timing, randomizing, continuous
strategies, strategic substitutes and complements, equilibrium existence. Applications to auditing
and pricing strategies. (Chapter 3)
D. Dynamic Games: subgame perfection, credibility, renegotiation. Applications to entry deterrence
and extortion. (Chapter 4)
E. Reputation and Repeated Games: finitely repeated games, indefinitely repeated games, reputation.
Applications to bargaining, branding, quality assurance, incentives. (Chapter 5)
F. Bargaining: splitting a pie, the Nash Bargaining Solution, sequential bargaining, the Rubinstein
Solution, outside options (Chapter 12)
URL: http://www.rasmusen.org/g751/0.g751.htm. Indiana University,
Department of Business Economics and Public Policy, in the
Kelley School of Business , BU 438, 1309 East Tenth Street, Bloomington, Indiana 47405-1701,
Learning Goals. The Kelley Dean's office has requested faculty to put on their syllabi linkage to
``Learning Goals'', in the style of Schools of Education. This course
helps with Learning Goal 1, Comprehensive and Intensive Disciplinary Knowledge, because it teaches
game theory results. It will help with Learning Goal 2, Comprehensive and Intensive Disciplinary
Knowledge of Research Methods, because it teaches game theory methods. It will help with Learning
Goal 3, Communication of Disciplinary Research, because students will learn how to set up models in
Learning Outcomes. What students will learn in this course is to read scholarly work using the
techniques of game theory and how to apply those techniques in their own work. This will involve
learning the use of specific concepts such as subgame perfectness, extensive forms, backwards
induction, the computation of mixed strategies, and the theory of repeated games.
Standard Kelley Notice:
Portions of this course may be subject to electronic proctoring. Video cameras may be used to
monitor the room during student assessment activities, including but not limited to, exams, tests,
and quizzes. Video recordings may be used to investigate or support disciplinary action. All
access to and use of video equipment and recordings will follow applicable IU policies.